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Appeared in the New York Times on July 22, 2017.
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June 16, 2017
Charlie Savage
clo The New York Times
1627 I Street, NW, ?th Floor
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Savage,
I am writing in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 18, 2017 for records
in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. Your request was received in
this office on the same date and assigned FOIA case tracking number 53042.
You requested access to the draft indictment of President Bill Clinton and related documents that
provide legal analysis on the ques1ion of whether a sitting President may be indicted, found in the
Records of Independent Counsels Kenneth Starr and Robert Ray.
I have conducted a preliminary assessment of the entries you identified from the OIC file manifest
and have confirmed the responsiveness of the following files:
486 DC, Paul Rosenzweig Attorney Work Files: 2. William Jefferson Clinton Indictment
232 DC, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files: 6. Presidential lndictability
232 DC, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files: 7. Project Idaho
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 2. DOJ Brief - Indictment After Impeachment
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 15. W JC Status Memorandum
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 16. WJC Status Memo Supplemental Materials
All of these records, with the exception of the file titled DOJ Brief - Indictment After Impeachment,
require screening fair categories of information exempted from disclosure under the terms of the
Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552), prior to public release. In particular, documents may be
redacted to preserve the secrecy of grand jury proceedings pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Requests for investigative files that do not exceed 500 pages are assigned to our first-tier
processing queue. Taking into consideration our existing backlog, the estimated time required to
complete the processing of your request is approximately 24 months from the date of this letter.
To notify this office of ~n your contact information or to track the status of your request,
please telephone 301. - . .or e-mail specialaccess foia @nara.gov. If you h~c
questions regarding the subject of your request, please contact me directly at 301or
1

~· All communications concerning this request should reference FOIA case
tracking number 53042.
If you are not satisfied with our action on this request and would like the opportunity to discuss our
response, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison for assistance:
Accessioned Executive Branch Records - Washington, DC Area
FOIA Requester Service Center: 301-837-3190
FOIA Public Liaison: Martha Wagner Murphy
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001
Telephone: 301 E-mail: dc.foia.liaison@nara.gov
Sincerely,

~~~
ROBERT REED
Archivist
Special Access and FOIA Staff
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July 10, 2017
Charlie Savage
c/o The New York Times
1627 I Street, NW, ?th Floor
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Savage,
I am writing in further response to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 18, 2017 for
records in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. Your request was
received in this office on the same date and assigned FOIA case tracking number 53042.
I have completed a line-by-line review of four documents found in the Records of Independent
Counsels Kenneth Starr and Robert Ray and released information to the greatest extent possible.
Two pages have been redacted to protect the personal privacy of living individuals per 5 USC 552
{b){6) and {b){7){C) and to protect information derived from documents filed under seal with the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A summary of the results of this review is
provided below:
DC box 405, John Bowler Attorney Work Files, DOJ Brief -- Indictment after
Impeachment, Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, August 18, 2000 (51 pages released in full).
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Presidential lndictability, Draft
Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, May 13, 1998 (56 pages; 54 pages
released in full and 2 pages released in redacted form).
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Project Idaho, Memorandum from
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
September 24, 1973 (41 pages released in full).
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Project Idaho, Memorandum from
Robert M. Bork, Solicitor General of the United States, October 5, 1973 (23 pages
released in full).
This concludes the processing of the expedited portion of your request. If you have questions
concerning my review of these documents or would like to make arrangements to receive copies,
please contact me directly at~ or 301.

1

If you are not satisfied with my action on this request, you have the right to file an administrative
appeal within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of this letter. Appeals must be in writing and
may be delivered by regular U.S. mail or by e-mail. By filing an appeal, you preserve your rights
under the Freedom of Information Act and present the deciding agency with an opportunity to
review your request and reconsider its decision. If you submit your appeal by regular mail, it
should be addressed to the Deputy Archivist of the United States {ND), National Archives and
Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 4200, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001.
Both the letter and envelope should be clearly marked "FOIA Appeal." If you submit your appeal
by e-mail, please send it to foia@nara.gov, addressed to the Deputy Archivist, with the words
"FOIA Appeal" in the subject line. Please be certain to explain why you believe this response does
not meet the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. All communications concerning this
request should referience FOIA case tracking number 53042.
If you would like the opportunity to discuss our response and attempt to resolve your dispute
without initiating the appeals process, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison for assistance:
Accessioned Executive Branch Records - Washington, DC Area
FOIA Requester Service Center: 301-837-3190
FOIA Public Liaison: Martha Wagner Murphy
8601 Adelphi Road , Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001
Telephone: 301E-ma.il: dc.foia.liaison@nara.gov
If you are unable to resolve your dispute through our Public Liaison, the Office of Government
Information Services {OGIS) is the federal FOIA ombudsman. OGIS offers mediation services to
help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies. You may contact OGIS at
the following address:
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS)
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road , Room 2510
College Park, MD 20740-6001
ogis@nara.gov

202-7 41-5770
1-877-684-6448
Sincerely,

~dt'i'
ROBERT REED

Archivist
Special Access and FOIA Staff
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504 E. PENNSYLVANIA AVE.
CHAMPAIGN!, IL 618~996

(21 7) 333-3459

The Honorable Kenneth W_ Starr
Independent Counsel
Office of the Independent Counsel
1001 Pennsylvania Ave .. N.W.

Suite 490 North
Washington, D.C. 20004

Re:

lNDICTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
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Dear Judge Starr:

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
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You have asked my legal opinion as to whether a sitting President is subject
to indictment. 1 Does the Constitution immunize a President from being indicted for
criminal activities while serving in the office of President? For example, if the
President committed a crime before assuming office, does his election to the
Presidency immunize his criminal activities? If the President in his private capacity
commits one or more crimes while in office, does his election serve to immunize him?
In short, is a sitting President above the criminal law?

27

As this opinion letter makes clear, I conclude that, in the circumstances of this

28
29

case, President. Clinton is subject to indictment and criminal prosecution, although
it may be the case that he could not be imprisoned (assuming that he is convicted and
that imprisonment is the appropriate punishment) until after he leaves that office.
A criminal prosecution and conviction (with imprisonment delayed) does not, in the
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For your information, I am attaching a resume listing my publications.
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words of Nixon v. Sirica, 2 "compete with the impeachment device by working a
constructive removal of the President from office."
In addition, I express no opinion as to whether a prosecution by state
authorities may be proper (a state prosecution may violate the Supremacy Clause).
Nor do l consider whether the President could be indicted if there were no
Independent Counsel statute. In the circumstances of this case, there is such a
statute, and it was enacted as the specific request of President Clinton, who knew at the time he lobbied for and signed the legislation - that a specific purpose of the
statute was to investigate criminal allegations involving him .. He welcomed the
independent investigation so that it could clear the air.
In addition, as discussed below, I express no opinion as to whether the Federal
·Government could indict a President for allegations that involve his official duties as
President. The Office of Independent Counsel is investigating allegations that do not
involve any official duties of President Clinton. The counts of an indictment against
President Clinton would include serious allegations involving witness tampering,
document destruction, perjury, subornation .of perjury, obstruction of justice,.
conspiracy, .and illegal pay-offs; these counts in no way relate to the President
Clinton's official duties, even though some of the alleged violations occurr~d after he
became President. The allegations involved here do not involve any sort of policy
dispute between the President and Congress. The allegations, in short, do not relate
to the President's official duties; they are not "within the outer perimeter of his
official responsitbility."3 Indeed, the alleged acts involved here are not only outside
the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibility. they are contrary to the
President's official responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully executed.
Also, as discussed below, a grand jury indictment is not inconsistent in present
circumstances with the conclusion reached by the Watergate Special Prosecutor.4 For
example, in the present case (and unlike the Watergate situation) a criminal
prosecution would not duplicate any impeachment proceeding already begun in the

2

487 F.2d 700, 7ll(D.C: Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (en bane). President Nixon chose
not to seek U.S. Supreme Court review of this decision. Instead he fired Watergate Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox.
3

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2704, 73 L.Ed.2d 349

(1982).

I should disclose that I was Assistant Majority Counsel to the Senate Watergate ·
Committee.
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House of Representatives.5 In the Watergate era, the House of Representatives had
- prior to the time that Special ·Prosecutor Leon Jaworski turned over any
information to the House Impeachment Inquiry - already made the independent
decision to begin, and, in fact, had begun impeachment proceedings_ In the present
case, no House Impeachment Inquiry has begun, and, if one were to begin, it would
only be ,b ecause the House of Representatives would be responding to information
that the Office of Independent Counsel would transfer to the House of
Representatives;. Watergate Prosecutor Jaworski, in short. did not want to preempt
the House inqtiiry that had independently begun. Now, there is no House inquiry.
and the OIC would not be preempting any House inquiry. While the Independent
Counsel statute authorizes the OIC to transmit relevant information to the House.
the statute does even suggest that the OIC must postpone any indictment until the
House and Senate shave have concluded any impeachment inquiry.

14
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In this country, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the state
that no one is "above the law.''6 The Constitution grants no one immunity from the
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See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 100 (1976). Watergate
Prosecutor Jaworski's views are discussed below. One should also note that, in the present
case, the House might not see fit to begin an impeachment, or it might decide that the alleged
violations of law do not merit removal from office, either because some acts occurred prior to
the time of President Clinton's assumption of office or because they do not rise to the level of
impeachable offences.
!i

As. Justice Joseph Story has noted: "There is also much force in the remark that an
impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political nature. It t.ouches neither his person, nor his
property; but simply divests him of his political capacity." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONITTITUTION, §§ 406, at p. 289 (RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina
Academic Press, 1987, originally published, 1833).
6

E.g., Unired States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196. 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 260, 27 L.Ed. 171
(1882); Unit.ed States v. United Mine Workers of AmerU:a, 330 U.S. 258, 343, 67 S.Ct. 677, 720,
91L..Ed.884 (1947); Ma/,one v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 651, 82 S.Ct. 980, 986, 8 L.Ed.2d 168
(1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mawne v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 651, 82 S.Ct. 980, 986,
8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting);Johnson v. Powell, 393 U.S. 920, 89 S.Ct. 250,
251, 21L.Ed.2d255 (1968)(Memorandum Opinion of Douglas, J., regarding application for a
stay); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 699, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2665, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972);
Grauel v. UniU!d States., 408 U.S. 606, 615, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); UniU!d
States u. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3111, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Butz u.
Econorrwu, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894,2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Davis u. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 246, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 758 & n. 41, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2705 & n.41, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982); Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1127, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Unit.ed States u..
(continued...)
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criminal laws. Congress enacted the present law governing the appointment of
Independent Counsel, at the specific request of President Clinton and Attorney
General Janet Reno. All of the parties - the President, the Attorney General,
Congress - knew that the specific and immediate purpose of this statute would
result in the appointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate certain
allegations of criminal activities that appeared to implicate the President of the
United States and the First Lady. Since that time, the Attorney General has, on
several occasions, successfully urged the Court to expand the jurisdiction of this
particular Office of Independent Counsel (hereinafter, ..OIC") to include other
allegations involving the President and Mrs. Clinton.

As the judiciary has noted in the past, the President "does not embody the
nation's sovereignty. He is not above the law's commands ...."7 The people "do not
forfeit through elections the right to have the law construed against and applied to
every citizen. Nor does the Impeachment Clause imply immunity from routine court
process."8
In the remainder of this opinion letter I examine the case law, the legal
commentators, the history and language of the relevant Constitutional provisions, the
legislative history of the Independent Counsel law, the logic and structure of our
Constitution, and the laws governing the Grand Jury's power to investigate and
indict. As discussed in detail below, if the Constitution really provides that the
President must be impeached before he can be prosecuted for breaking the criminal
law - even if the President commits a crime prior to the time he became President.,
or if he commits a crime in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity as
President - , the our Constitution has created serious anomalies.

27
First, it is quite clear that a President may be impeached for actions that do

28

6

( ..• continued)
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 706, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 3076, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987)Brennan, J .. joined by
Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 103 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1146 n . 2, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)(Souter, J., joined by
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); Clinton v. Jones, - U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1645,
137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).
7

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 at 711 (footnote omitted).

8

Nixon u. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 711 (per curiam) (en bane) (footnote
omitted)(emphasis added).
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not violate any criminal statute.11 Acts that (a) constitute impeachable offenses and
(b) are violations of a crime created by statute (our Constitution recognizes no
common law crimes) are two different categories of acts. Moreover, if the President
does commit a crime, that does not necessarily mean that ·h e must be impeached,
because some crimes do not merit impeachment and removal from office.

For example, if the President in a moment of passion slugs an irritating
heckler, he has committed a criminal battery. But no one would suggest that the
President should be removed from office simply because of that assault. Yet, the
President has no right to assault. hecklers. 10 If there is no recourse against the
President, if he cannot be prosecuted for violating the criminal laws, he will be above
the law. Clinton v. Jones rejected such an immunity; instead, it emphatically agreed
with the Eight Circuit that: "the President, like other officials, is subject to the same
laws that apply to all citizens." 11 The "rationale for official immunity 'is inapposite
where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue."' 12 The President has
no immunity in such a case. If the Constitution prevents the President from being
indicood for violations of one or more federal criminal statutes, even if those statutory
violations are not impeachable offences, then the Constitution authorizes the
President to be above the law. But the Constitution creates an Executive Branch
with the President under a sworn obligation to faithfully executive the law. The
Constitution does not create an absolute Monarch above the law.
In addition, as also discuss~d below, if the President must be impeached prior
to being prosecuted for serious violations of the criminal law, then Congress would
have the final determination of when a criminal prosecution must begin. But it
violates the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers for the legislative branch of
government to control when (or if) a criminal prosecution may.occur. It would even
violate the Separation of Powers if Congress were to make the decision of the
9

See, e.g., JOSEPH S'I'ORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSI'ITUTION, §§ 405,.at p. 288
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press. 1987, originally
published, 1833): "Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous
statute is necessary to authorize any impeachment of any official misconduct ...."
(RONALD

°
Cf. Gary Borg, Chreti.en U; Charged Bri.e{ly with Assault, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1996,
at AlO, avai/,abk in 1996 WE.srLAw 2669290 (reporting that the Canadian Prime Minister the first time this century that a sitting Canadian Prime Minister was faced with criminal
charges - was charged with assault for grabbing a protester by the throat; the charge was
later quashed).
1

It

- U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1638. (1997).

12

117 S.Ct. 1636, 1641 (quoting Eight Circuit)(emphasis added).
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Attorney General to refuse to seek (or to seek) the appointment of an independent

2
3

counsel subject to judicial review. 13

4
S

Moreover, as the case law discussed below indicates, if the Grand Jury cannot
indict the President, it cannot constitutionally investigate him. But, in Morrison v.
Olson14 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel
Act and the constitutionality of grand jury investigations under the direction of an
Independent Counsel appointed by the court. Morrison implicitly decided the issue
analyzed in this opinion letter.

6

·: 7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

The Constitution does grant limited immunity to federal legislators in certain
limited contexts, as discussed below, but those immunities do not exempt Senators
or Representatives from the application of the criminal laws. One looks in vain to
find any textual support in the Constitution for any Presidential immunity (either

13

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). The
Court made it quite clear that it was necessary, in order to save the constitutionality of the
Independent Counsel statute, for the Court to conclude that it gave neither Congress nor the
Special Division any power to force the Attorney General to appoint an Independent Counsel
nor any power to direct or supervise the Independent Counsel once the appointment took place.
For example. the Court in Morrison also said: "[T]he Special Division has no power ro appoint
an independent counsel sua sponte; it may do so upon the specific request of the Attorney
General, and the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's
decision not to seek appointment." 487 U.S. at 695, 108 S.Ct. at 2621. As to Congress, the
Court said: "The Act does empower certain Members of Congress to request the Attorney
General to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General has
no duty to comply with the request, although he must respond within a certain time limit." 487
U.S. at 694, 108 S.Ct. at 2621. The Att.orney General's decision not to appoint an Independent
Counsel is "committed to his unreviewable discretion," even though the Act purports to require
the Attorney General to appoint unless "he finds 'no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation is warranted."' 487 U.S. at 696, 108 S.Ct. at 2622.
Morrison also made clear that Congress could not remove or prevent the removal of the
Independent Counsel, and the Special Division could not remove the Independent Counsel.
In order to save the statute's constitutionality, the Court interpreted the statUJtory provision
relating to termination to mean virtually nothing: "It is basically a device for removing from
the public payroll an.independent counsel who has served her purpose, but is unwilling to
acknowledge the fact. So construed, the Special Division's power to terminate does not pose
a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the
Executive's authority to require that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III."
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683, 108 S.Ct. at 2615. See. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Case Against
Special Prosecuwrs, WALL STREET J OURNAL, Jan. 15, 1990, at p. AB.
14

487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
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absolute or temporary) from the commands of the criminal laws. If the framers of our
Constitution wanted to create a special immunity for the President, they could have
written the relevant clause. '.I'hey certainly knew how to write immunity clauses, for
they wrote two immunity clauses that apply to Congress. 15 But they wrote nothing
to immunize the President. Instead, they wrote an Impeachment Clause treating the
President and aill other civil officers the same way. Other civil officers, like judges,
have been criminally prosecuted without being impeached. Sitting Vice Presidents
have been indicted even though they were not impeached.
As Nixon v. Sirica16 carefully noted: ''Because impeachment is available against
all 'civil officers of the Untied Sates,' not merely against the President, it is difficult
to understand how any immunities peculiar to the President can ·e manate by
implication from the fact ofimpeachability." Moreover, it would be anomalous and
aberrant to interpret the Impeachment Clause to immunize the President for alleged
criminal acts, some of which occurred prior to the time he assumed the Presidency
and all far removed from any of the President's enumerated duties: witness
tampering, destruction of documents, subornation of perjury, perjury, illegal pay-offs.

18
19

BACKGROUND.

20
21
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25
26
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30
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32

The. Office of Independent Counsel has investigated and continues to
investigate various matters that are loosely grouped under the name of "Whitewater,"
which is a particular real estate deal that involves land developed in Arkansas. The
"Whitewater" label is often used in the popular press. However, the investigative
mandate to this Office of Independent Counsel is broade:r than this title implies.
There are land deals other than Whitewater that are part of this investigation as well
as other matters, such as the scandal involving the White House Travel Office and
the misuse of FBI files by political operatives working in the White House. More
recently, the Attorney General petitioned the Court to expand OIC's mandate and
jurisdiction to include various allegations surrounding Ms. Monica Lewinsky and
involving obstruction of justice, witness tampering, perjury, and suborning of
perjury. 17

U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 [limited privilege from arrest; speech or debate
privilege]. Both of these immunities are very limited in scope, as discussed below.
ui

16

487 F.2d at 700, 711 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)(per curiam) (internal
citation omitted, citing the Impeachment Clause, Art. II, § 4) ..
17

In that case, when the Ole came upon the initial information, the Ole referred .
the matter to the Attorney General and suggested various alternatives: the Department of
(continued...)
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Attorney General Janet Reno and the Department of Justice have rejected the
claims of those who seek to narrow the jurisdiction of this OIC. 18 In addition, the
Attorney General has, at various times, expanded the original jurisdiction of the OIC
to include matters beyond those originally within the OIC mandate. 19 Indeed, the
Attorney General has even gone to court in order to submit these matters to you and
to expand the OIC's jurisdiction over your objection.20 While she has expanded the

17

( •• •continued)
Justice could take over the investigation, or the DOJ could investigate together with the OIC,
or the DOJ could turn over the entire matter to the OIC, or the DOJ could seek the
appointment of a new Independent Counsel. The Att.orney General chose the third alternative
and promptly asked the Special Division to expand the jurisdiction of the OIC.

The Special Division granted this special request of the Attorney General. The OIC did
investigate after it had received oral authorization t.o do so. This oral authorization was
followed by written authorization.
18

When others have claimed that the OIC is acting outside of its jurisdiction (a
claim, for example, that Governor Jim Guy Tucker advanced in court), the Attorney General
has also supported the OIC's jurisdiction and the Eight Circuit agreed with this position.
19

The scandal and charges that have been collectively referred to as "Travel-gate"
(involving the White House Travel Office) or the "FBI Files" (referring to FBI files sent to the
White House and then used for partisan purposes) fit in this category.
The Attorney General's efforts to expand your jurisdiction are also significant because
recent events show that she is often reluctant to seek the appointment of a Independent
Counsel. She has refused to appoint an Independent Counsel in various matters relating to
campaign finance, even when the Director of the FBI has supported the appointment of an
Independent Counsel. And, in matters involving other Independent Counsel, she has objected
to any expansion of jurisdiction, even when the courts have eventually ruled that her position
was legally in error. E.g., Terry Eastland, llow Justice Tried to Swp Smaltz, Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 22, 1997, at A19, col. 3-6 (Midwest ed.).
20

It is unusual for the subject of an investigation by an Independent Counsel to
attack the bona {ides of the Independent Counsel. For example. neither Attorney General
Meese nor his personal attorney ever personally attacked the people investigating him, even
though the Independent Counsel was a member of the other political party. In fact, it has been
typical for the Independent Counsel to be a member of the opposing political party.
I am aware that some supporters of President Clinton (including his wife and
occasionally the President himself) have engaged in public attacks on the OIC and personal
attacks on the bona {ides of its attorneys. They accuse the OIC of partisanship and abuse of
the prosecutorial powers. However, the fact that Attorney General Reno - who serves at the
(continued ...)
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jurisdiction of the OIC, President Clinton has refuse<j/on several occasions to testify
before the Grand Jury, had pled executive privilegeµ} block his aides from testifying,
and has urged the creation of a new
e of rivil ·eto revent Secret Service ents
from test" ·
/
I

I

'

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

Notwithstanding these roadblocks. the investigation is proceeding to the point
that there is significant, credible, persuasive evidence that the President has been
involved in various illegal activities in a conspiracy with others (in particular his
wife), to tamper with witnesses, suborn perjury, commit perjury, hide or destroy
incriminating documents, and obstruct justice.

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

If the President were· any other official of the United States, for example, a
Cabinet Officer or a Congressperson, I understand that the two Deputy Independent
Counsel (one, a former U.S. Attorney and the other, a former member of the Public
Integrity Section of the Department of Justice) have concluded that an indictment
would be proper and would issue given the evidence before the Grand Jury. The
Office of Independent Counsel is, in general, required to follow the Department of
Justice regulations governing otlier federal prosecutors. To refuse to indict the
President when the crimes are serious enough and the evidence strong enough that
20

( ••• continued)
pleasure of President Clinton and is the highest law enforcement official in the Department
of Justice - has gone to court to expand your jurisdiction (even over your objection) is
inconsistent with these attacks. If she thought that the OIC or any of its attorneys were acting
improperly in investigating President Clinton. she would make no sense for her to be fightirlg
to expand the OIC's jurisdiction. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d
569 (1988), discussed below, made it quite clear that the Attorney General's decision not to
seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel is Mt reviewable in any court.

Recently, a bipartisan group of former Attorneys General of the United States have
joined together to rebut the attacks on the integrity of the Independent Counsel. Their
statement of March, 1998, was extraordinary. It said, in part:
"As former attorneys general, we are concerned that the severity of the
attacks on Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and his office by high-

leve[ government officials and attorneys representing their particular
interests. among others, appear to have the improper purpose of
influencing and impeding an ongoing criminal investigation and
intimidating possible jurors, witnesses and even investigators."
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a S enator or Cabinet Secretary would be indicted would be/inconsistent with the
OIC's obligations to exercise its prosecutorial discretion the same way that the
Department of Justice attorneys exercise their discretion to/refuse to indict.
1

I

I

i

Moreover, there is the apparent injustice that would: result if the Grand Jury
would seek to indict the various members of this consp~~cy (e.g., Hillary Rodham
Clinton) while refusing to indict the center of the consp~acy. 21
I

I

If the Grand Jury simply issues a report of the fact$ that it has found, but does
not indict even though it concludes that there is su,bstantial evidence that the
President has committed serious crimes, then the Presiaent has no judicial forum to
present his side of the story and seek vindication in/the judicial system. As then
Solicitor General Robert Bork said, in arguing that sitting Vice President can be
indicted:
/

a

I

15

I
I

"An officer may have co-conspir~tors and even if the officer

16

I

I
I

21

I

I
I

I

I
I
I
I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

,
I
I

I
I
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were immune [from indictment], his co-conspirators would not be.
The result would be that the grand and petit juries would receive
evidence about the illegal transactions and that evidence would
inevitably name the officer. The trial might end up in the

5

conviction of the co-conspirators for their dealings with the

6

officer, yet the officer would not be on trial, would not have the
opportunity to cross-examine and present testimony on his own
behalf. The man and his office would be slandered and
demeaned without a trial in which he was heard. The individual
might prefer that to the risk of punishment, but the courts should
not adopt a rule that opens the office to such a damaging
procedure."22

1

2
3

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21·
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29

Consequently, you have asked my legal oprmon as to whether it is
constitutional to indict a sitting President for actions that occurred both before he
became President and while he was under investigation.
In order to answer the question, it is important to understand the
constitutional issue in context. The question is not, as an abstract matter, whether
any sitting President is immune from the criminal laws of the state or federal
governments as long as he is in office. Rather, the question is whether - given the
enactment of the Independent Counsel law under which the OIC operates, given the
historical background that led to that law, and given the constitutionality of that law
as determined by Morrison v. Olson23 - it is constitutional for a grand jury to indict
this President if the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the
President is part of an extensive and continuing conspiracy, stretching over many
years, involving witness tampering, document destruction, perjury, subornation of
perjury, obstruction of justice, and illegal pay-offs - all serious allegations that in
no way relate to the President Clinton's official duties, even though some of the

22

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 21 (emphasis added). Judge Bork concluded that a sitting Vice
President could be indicted prior to impeachment but he also said (in dictum) that the
President would be immune from indictment prior to impeachment. While Judge Bork argued
that the President should be immune from indictment, his reasoning at this point supports the
opposite conclusion. His point is well-taken: the Office of Independent Counsel should not cast
a charge against the President without giving him a judicial forum within which to vindicate
himself.
23

487 U.S. 654, l08 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
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1
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45
6

alleged violations occurred after he 'became President.
Before turning to this particular question, it is useful to consider some

background matters.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CHIEF ExECUTIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21 22

23
24

First, it is interesting that democracies in other countries do not recognize a
principle that an individual would be above the law and privileged to engage in
criminal activities simply because he or she is the President, Premier, Prime
Minister, Chief Executive, or Head of State. In fact, heads of state are not immune
from criminal prosecution even if we only look at countries with a tradition of living
under the rule of law that is much weaker than the tradition that exists in the United
States. I have been unable to find any instances where a democracy - even a
democracy that also recognizes a King or Queen - has immunized its Chief
Executive Officer from criminal conduct simply because he or she is the Chief
Executive Officer.
On the other hand, it is quite easy to find examples of foreign heads of state
subject to prosecution for allegedly criminal activities. Even if one confines a search
to the relatively short time period since -1980, it is not difficult to find various
examples of heads of state who have been subject to the possibility of criminal
prosecution (what we call "indictment" in this country) in a wide variety of
countries.24

25
26

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37

Other countries are governed by their own Constitutions, and the fact that
their chief executives (like their other citizens) are subject to the criminal law does
not, of course, mean that the chief executive officer of the United States is subject to
its federal criminal laws. Each of these instances is, in a sense, unique and one can
therefore distinguish them from the present circumstance.
Consequently, I do not rely on the examples discussed below in reaching the
conclusions of the opinion letter. I simply present these examples as suggesting that
the claim that the chief executive officer of the United States is immune from
criminal prosecution and above the law as long as he holds the chief executive office
is a claim that other countries (at least those who are not governed by a dictatorship)
would find curious if not peculiar.

38
39

In VENEZUELA, in l 993, President Carlos Andres Perez was ordered to stand trial on

24

In this case, I used a computerized search ofWESI'L.\ w for t he period since 1980.
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13
embezzlement charges. Perez has ·tl!e dubious distinction of being the first incumbent
Venemelan president charged with a crime sinc.e the oountry shed a military dlictatorship and
became a democracy in 195 8. The provisional government of Octavio Lepage was sworn
in to replac.e Mr. Perez.25

1
2
3
4

In PAKISTAN, in 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was charged with contempt of court
after criticizing the judiciary, which is a crime in Pakistan. Sharif pleaded innocent. A
conviction could lead to his removal from office.26 The fact that he held the office of Prime
Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law.

5
6
7
8

In ITALY, prosecutors requested the indictment of Prime Minister Romano Prodi on charges
ofcorrupt management ofthe oountry's state industries. The charges arose from the transfer
of a food production company from state to private hands in 1993. Prodi was accused of
fixing the sale of a large package of shares in the company by offering it to a politically
well-connected private concern at a cut-price rate. The fact that he was Prime Minister did
not immuniz.e him from the rule of law. A preliminary magistrate was in charge of deciding
whether to order Prodi to stand trial.17

9
10
11
12
13

1415
.

16

~

17
18

19
20
21

22

CANADA, Prime Minister Jean Chretien was charged with assault for manhandling a
protester. His office of Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law. Of
course, the fact that he could be charged does not mean that he would be convicted, and, in
fact, the charges were quashed. This was the first time this century that a sitting Canadian
prime minister faced criminal assault charges. Kenneth Russell, brought the charge against
the prime minister for grabbing a demonstrator by the throat during a Flag Day ceremony.18

In

In FRANCE, traders said that "one of the major reasons for the enactment of emergency
money market measures has been removed with Wednesday's decision not to pursue
criminal charges against the Prime Minister for illegally acquiring cheap apartments for
himself and his son." However, if the evidenc.e warranted, Prime Minister Alain Juppe
would not be immunized from the rule of law and could have been prosecuted.19

23

24
25

26

...

27

In ISRAEL, in 1995, Shekem workers asked Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair to open a

26

Venezuela Ponders Next Move as President Ordered to Stand Trial, ATLANTA
JOURNAL & CONST1TUTION, May 23, 1993, A 10, available in 1993 WESTLAw 3364034.
26

Sharif Warns Cri.sis Taking Pakistan Near Destruction, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS
Nov. 19, 1997. Raymond Bonner, Pakistan's Army May Settle Political Feud, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 199'7, at A4.
SERV.,

27

Italian PM Faces Accusations, VANCOlNERSUN, Nov. 26. 1996, A7. available in
1996 WestLaw 5031681; Andrew Gumbel, Prosecut.ors Turn Sights on Italian PM, THE INDEP.
(London), Nov. 26, 1996, at 15, International Section.
28

Gary Borg, Chretien is Charged Briefly with Assault, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1996,
at AlO, available in 1996 WESTLAW 2669290.
29

Capital Markets Report. Oct. 12, 1995; Reuters World Service, Oct. 11, 1995.
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criminal investigation against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for allegedJJy violating sub
judice laws. Rabin charged that "Shekem's fired workers are parasites." Israel's laws forbid

3
4
5

ruling. 30 Rabin's office of Prime Minister did not serve to· irnmwtize him from the rule of
law.
·

1

publishing information on an issue negotiated in court if it could influence the court's

In JAPAN, prosecutors ultimately refused to press charges against Prime Minister Noboru.
Takeshita or any other major political leader being investigated for criminal activity int
conpection with an influence-peddling scandal. Former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
and at least three cabinet members in Takeshita's government.also escaped !indictment. The
scandal, however, forced Takeshita to announce on April 25, 1989, that he would resign.3 L
Once again, the Prime Minister was subject to the rule of law, and if the evidence had
warranted could have been criminally pros•ecuted.

6
7
8
9
10

11
12

...

\4
15

In PAPUANEWGUJNEA, a judge recommended that Prime Minister Bill Skate face criminal
charges if evidence that he failed to stop a mutiny was confirmed.32 The fact that he was
Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law.

16
17

In SLOVAKIA, in 1996, President Michael Kovac filed criminal slander .charges against
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.33 The fact that Meciar held the office of Prime Minister

13

30

Galit Lipkis Beck, Shekem Workers: Investigate Rabin, JERUSALEM POST, Feb.
21, .1 995, AB, availabk in 1995 WESTLAW 7552690; ·Galit Lipkis Beck, Shekem Workers Protest
Rabin's Insults, J ERUSALEM POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at p. 15, in Economics Section.
In another instance, ISRAEL, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, faced a
parliamentary no confidence vote after an inquiry found "insufficient evidence to link him t.o
an alleged plot to subvert the investigation of a right-wing coalition ally on corruption charges
by appointing a loyal but unqualified attorney general, Mr. Roni Bar On." Julian Borger,
Confidence Vote Can Only Be Bad News for Netanyahu, IRISH TIMES, Jun. 24, 1997, AlO.
availahl.e in 1997 WESTLAw 12011461; Anton La Guardia, Netanyahu Vows to Battle on After
Escaping Charges, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 21, 1997, at 13, International Section. If the
inquiry had found sufficient evidence, he would have been subject to indictment. His office of
Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule oflaw.
31

Probe Ends, Japan's PM Not Charged in Scandal,, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 30,
1989, B6, availabk in 1989 WESTLAw 5664899; Steven R. Weisman, Japanese Prosecutors End
Scandal Inquiry Witlwut Indicting Major Figures, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1989, at A3.
32

Papua New Guinea's PM Could Face Criminal Charges in Mutiny, Dow J ONES
Dec. 15, 1997. Around the World, S EATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15. 1997.

INT'L N EWS S ERV.,
33

Sl.ovakia President Fiks Charges Against Prime Minister, Dow J ONES INT'L NEWS .

S ERV., May 30, 1996.
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did not serve to immunize him from the rule oflaw.J"
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These examples should not be surprisin.g. As Chief Justice Marshall stated
nearly two centuries ago, in Marbury v. Madison, 35 the case that has become the
fountainhead of American constitutional law: ''The government of the United States
has emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."36 And, he added, "In
Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he
never fails to comply with the judgment of his court."37

10
11

Let us now turn specifically to American law. The first item to consider is the
language and structure of our Constitution.

12
13
14

THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

15

Chief Justice Marshall explained that the Constitution "assigns to different
3

Cf. THAILAND, in 1992, where Prime Minister Suchinda Krapra.yoon resigned
'
aft.er "acr.epting responsibility for the deaths of at least 40 people and the wounding of more
than 600 when army troops opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators."
Demonstrat.ors demanded that trials be held for Suchinda and top military officers who were
responsible for ordering troops to fire on unarmed demonstrators. A decree granted the Prime
Minister amnesty from criminal charges arising from the repression of the protests. If there
were no decree, the Prime Minister would be subject to the rule of law, and the fact that he
was Prime Minister would not serve to immunize him. Even after the pardon, an effort was
under way t.o have the amnesty decree declared illegal by a constitutional tribunal. Charles
P. Wallace, Long-Awaited Constitutional Reforms Made in Thailand, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), May 26. 1992, A3, available in 1992 WESTLAw 7837659; William Branigin,
Amnesty Oppositwn Building iri Thailand, HousroN CHRONICLE, May 25, 1992, A24.
Also in THAILAND, in 1996, criminal fraud charges were leveled against Prime Minister
Banharn Silpa-archa. His office of Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law.
The Bangkok Post said that "the charges involved allegations about the sale of land by Mr.
Banharn's daughter, Ms. Kanchana, to the state and the diversion of a seven-billion-baht
($393-million) fund from the environment to the Interior Ministry, which Mr. Banharn heads
as minister." Banharn Faces Criminal Charges: Opposition, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Sept. 4,
1996, available in 1996 WESTLAW 11723429; PM Faces Criminal Charges: Move to Slww
Banharn's Zero Credibility, THE BANGKOK POST, June 3, 1997, at p. 1.
35

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

36

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.

37

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents
as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footrwte, 1975 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1975), cited, e.g. in
Clinton u. Jones, - U.S. -, -. 117 S.Ct. 1636, -, 137 L·.Ed.2d 945 (1997).
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departments their respective powers."38 So that "those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is
that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be
·passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a
government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts
prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation."39

written constitution, and the Constitution was written
so that we would be governed by the written words, it is useful to look at what that
writing says about immunities from prosecution. Let us look at the language of the
Constitution.
. Because we live under a

Our written Constitution has two specific sections that refer to what may be
categorized as some type of "immunity" from the ordinary reach of the laws.
THE PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST.

First, Senators and Representatives are "privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same ... ,"except in cases of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace ....''40

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

This section illustrates several important factors. First, the Framers of our
Constitution thought about immunity, and when they did. they gave a limited immunity to
the Senat.ors and Representatives. No similar clause applies to any member of the Executive
Branch nor any member of the Judicial Branch. Second, the immunity·granted is really quite
narrow. It only applies during a legislative session. Moreover, it is limited to arrest in civil
cases, an obsolete form of arrest that no longer exists.41

32
33

The Privilege from Arrest Clause does rwt apply at all to criminal cases. It
does not protect the Senator or Representative from service of process in a criminal

311

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.

39

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.

U.S. CONST., ART. I,§ 6, cl. 1.
41

See discussion in, 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J OHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 8.9, "Privilege from Arrest" 0Nest Pub. Co .. 2d ed. 1992). See also, .
Williamson u. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 435-46, 28 S .Ct. 163, 166, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908).
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case.42 It does not even protect the Senator or Representative from serVice of process
in a civil case.43 In other words, this clause immunizes a Senator or Representative
against a procedure that no longer exists - arrest in a civil case.

A13 Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court, has warned us, this
narrow privilege should be narrowly construed:
"Clause 1 [the privilege from arrest clause] defines the extent of the
immunity. Its language is exact and leaves no room for a construction
which would extend the privilege beyond the terms of the grant."44

8
9
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14
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16

17
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THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE.

The same clause of the Constitution contains the only other reference to a
privilege or immunity from the criminal law. It provides that, "for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."45
The Supreme Court has interpreted this "Speech or Debate" Clause, like the
Privilege from Arrest Clause, quite narrowly. For example, if the Executive Branch
seeks to prosecut.e a Member of Congress for taking a bribe to vote a certain way, the
prosecution cannot introduce into the trial the vote of the Representative, but the
prosecution can introduce into evidence the "(p ]romises by a Member to perform an
act in the future," because "a promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act."46 In
other words, Members of Congress can be criminally prosecuted for taking a bribe to
introduce legislation into Congress, notwithstanding the supposed protections of the
Speech or Debate Clause.

27
28
29

30
31

In addition, the Speech or Debate Privilege, like the Arrest Privilege, only
applies to the Jegislative branch, not the executive branch. The Constitutional
language makes that quite clear. The existence of these two privileges and the
absence of any similarly clear language creating any sort of Presidential privilege is
42

United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cases 626, (4 Dall.) 341, 1 L.Ed. 859 (C.C.Pa.

1800).
Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82, 55 S.Ct. 21, 22, 79 L.Ed. 208 (1934).
Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82, 55 S.Ct. 21, 22, 79 L.Ed. 208 (1934).
U.S.
46

CONST. ART.

I, § 6, cl. 1.

United States u. lfelstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489-90, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2439-40, 61 ·

L.Ed.2d 12 (1979)(emphasis in original).
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significant. If the Framers of our Constitution had wanted to create some
constitutional privilege to shield the President or any other member of the Executive
Branch from criminal indictment (or to prevent certain officials from being indicted
before they were impeached), they could have drafted such a privilege. They
certainly know how to draft immunity language, for they drafted a very limited
immunity for the federal legislature.
Yet, even in the case of federal legislators, the Constitution gives no immunity
from indictment. As then Solicitor General Robert Bork concluded, in rejecting the
argument that the United States could not indict a sitting Vice President:

11

"The Constitution provides no explicit immunity from
criminal sanctions for any civil officer. The only express
immunity in the entire document is found in Article I, Section 6,
which provides, [here he quotes the "arrest clause"].

12
13

14
15
16

"Since the Framers knew how to, and did, spell out an
immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity exists where
. none is mentioned. Indeed, any other reading would turn the
constitutional te.x t on its head: the construction advanced by
counsel for the Vice President requires that the explicit grant of
immunity t.o legislators be read as in fact a partial withdrawal of
a oomplete immunity legislators would otherwise h ave possessed
in common with other government officers. The intent of the
Framers was to the contrary."·"

17
18

19
20
21 .
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23
24
25

26
27
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32
33
34
35
36

THE IMPEACHMENT CLAUSE.

The Language. There is only one impeachment clause in the Constitution.
It does not purport to distinguish the impeachment of a federal judge from the Vice
President, nor does it distinguish the impeachment of the Vice President from the
President. The clause provides:
"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to. hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and

37
47

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T . Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
Memorandum for t he United Sta tes Concerning the Vice Preside n t's Claim of Constitutional ·
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, a t p. 5.
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subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment,
according to Law ."48
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This clause indicates that Congress should not be entrusted with the power to
impose any penalty on an impeached official other than (or no greater than) removal
from office and disqualification from further office. Criminal penalties would be left
to the judiciary. In addition, the clause makes clear that double jeopardy would not
bar a criminal prosecution. The clause does not state that criminal prosecution must
come after an impeachment, nor does it state that the refusal of the House to impeach
(or the Senate to remove from office) would bar a subsequent criminal prosecution.

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20

The Commentators and the Case Law. The available historical evidence
as .to the meaning of this clause is sparse. One can find various historical references
that assume that impeachment would precede indictment, but these references, as
Professor John Hart Ely concluded, "did not argue that the Constitution required that
order."49 Professor Ely, at the time, was a consultant to Archibald Cox, then the
Watergate Special Prosecut.or, when he made these comments and concluded that the
Constitution does not require that impeachment and removal precede a criminal
indictment, even of the President. In 1996, in the midst of the Whitewater
investigation, he reaffirmed his analysis.60

21.

22
23
24
25
26

27

Judge Robert Bork agrees with Professor Ely, his former colleague at the Yale
Law School. While Solicitor General, Judge Bork concluded., when "the Constitution
provides that the 'Party convicted' is nonetheless subject to criminal punishment,"
that language does "not establish the sequence of the two processes, but [exists] solely
to establish that conviction upon impeachment does not raise a double jeopardy
defense in a criminal trial."61
48

U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Clause 6 provides that if the President is subject

t.o impeachment, the Chief Justice of the United States shall preside. The framers evidently

thought that the person who normally presides over the Senate [i.e. the Vice President of the
Unit.ed States] should not preside in the case of a Presidential impeachment because he would
be in a conflict of interest.
49

J OHN HART ELY, ONCONSl'ITUTIONAL GROUND 138 (Princeton University Press
1996) (emphasis added).
60

J OHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 138-39 (Princeton University

Press 1996).
111

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury lmpanel,ed December 5, 1972, Applicatwn .
of S p iro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73·965,
(continued... )
)
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Of course, impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate is the only
constitutional way to remove the President or Vice President or federal judges from
office. A criminal conviction in an Article III federal court of a federal official does not
remove this official from offic.e , even if the criminal act would also constitute "high
crimes or misdemeanors."
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The debates surrounding the drafting of the Constitution are "rife with
assertions that the president is not a monarch above the law. and so the argument
must proceed along the line that the president must be impeached before he can be
criminally prosecuted."52 Let us consider some of these historical sources.
For example, in one of the FEDERALIST PAPERS, Alexander Hamilton says, "The
punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not
to terminate the chastisement of the offender."53 Another FEDERALIST PAPER (also
penned by Hamilton) stat.es the President can be impeached for "treason, bribery, or
other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law."54 Perhaps this
language only means that if the President is being charged with actions that are
peculiarly and uniquely contrary to Presidential responsibility (like treason
committed while President, or acceptance of bribes while President), then
impeachment must precede indictment. But that interpretation would mean that
other crimes (assault and battery, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury,
suborning perjury in a civil case, etc.) can be prosecuted prior to impeachment and
removal from office.

25

26

Against this sparse language (which nowhere asserts that impeachment and

61

( ••• continued)
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 10 (emphasis added). Solicitor General Bork, in this
Memorandum ,by way of dictum, also concluded, based on the case law that existed at the
time, that the President was immune from criminal prosecution prior to indictment.

:12

JOHN HART ELY, ONCONITTITUTIONAL GROUND 138 (Princeton University Press

S!l

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 65,

8th

paragraph (Alexander Hamilton). In No.

.54

THE

FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 69,

4th

paragraph (Alexander Hamilton) .

1996).

69.
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removal must precede criminal indictment in all cases)55 is other specific historical.
language that goes the other way and indicates that the Framers of our Constitution
concluded that, unlike federal legislators, no special constitutional immunity should
attach to the President.56

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16

17
18

Consider, for example, the remarks of James Wilson, in the course of the
Pennsylvania debates on the Constitution. He said: "far from being above the laws,
he [the President] is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in
his public character by impeachment."67 That quotation implies that the President
can be criminally prosecuted like any other citizen, without regard to impeachment.
Similarly, Iredell, in the course of the North Carolina debates on the Constitution,
said: ''Ifhe [the President] commits any misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable.
... If he commits any crime, he is punishable by the laws of his country, and in
capital cases may be deprived of his life."68
Wilson was hardly a solitary voice.
obs1e rver, also stated:

Charles Pinckney, a contemporary

"Let us inquire, why the Constitution should have been so
attentive to each branch of Congress, so jealous of their [i.e.,
Congressional] privileges [Pinckney had just referred to the
Congressional privilege from arrest, discussed above], and have
shewn so little to the President of the United States in this
respect. . . . No privilege of this kind was intended for your

19

20
21
22

23
24

66

Professor John Hart Ely, who examined the historical references for Watergate
Special Prosecut.or Archibald Cox, also concluded that the hist.orical references do not require
that impeachment and removal precede a criminal indictment, even of the President. JOHN
HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 139 (Princeton University Press 1996).
156

See, e.g., MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at p. 1066 (191 l)(comments of Charles Pinckney); 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 71 (1800)(Senator
Pinckney, stating that "our Constitution supposes no man ... t.o be infallible, but considers
them all as mere me n, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and. crimes, that men
generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of such as ought to be tried ...."); Eric M.
Freedman, Achieving Political Adulthood, 2 NEXUS 67, 68 (Spring, 1997), also discussing
account of Charles Pinckney, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
67

2 ELLIO'f'T'S DEBATES 480, quoted in WATERGATE SPECWJ PROSECUTION FORCE,
Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara. at 7-8.
158

4 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 109, quoted in WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE.. .
Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at .S n .7.
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Executive, nor any except that which I have mentioned for your
Legislature. The Convention which formed the Constitution well
knew that this was an important point, and no subject had been
more abused than privilege. They therefore determined so set the
example, in merely limiting privilege to what was necessary, and
no more." 159
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Tench Coxe, in his Essays on the Constitution, published in the Independent
Gazetteer in September, 1787, agreed. He concluded, in discussing the President:
"His person is not so much protected a.s that of a member of
the·House of Representatives.- for he· may be proceeded against like
any other man in the ordinary course of law." (emphasis in
original). 60

When those who argue that the President is immune from the criminal law
until after he has been impeached look to the historical sources, the very most that
they could draw from the historical debates in support of their view is that there
certainly was no agreement to create any Presidential immunity from criminal
indictment (either absolute or temporary), for the easiest way to create it (temporary
or otherwise) would have been to add a clause to the Constitution defining its
existence and extent. In fact. the contemporary sources suggest that the Constitution
provides no criminal immunity for any President who commits crimes in his personal
capacity.
This analysis should not be surprising; it is the same conclusion reached in

Nixon v. SiTica,61 where the Court- after examining the Constitutional debates and
the views of the Framers of our Constitution - said:
59

10 ANNUALS OF CONGRESS 74 (1800). Also quoted in, 3 MAx FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385, also cited in JOHN HART ELY, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 415 (Princeton University Press 1996).
60

Quoted in, 2 THE D OCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
141 (1976), quoted with approval in Nimn v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, - (D.C. Cir.
1973)(per curiam)(en bane).

CONS1'ITIITION

61

Nuon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane). President
Nixon chose not to appeal this ruling.
Samuel Dash (also a special consultant to the Office of Independent Counsel) and I were
two of the attorneys who filed a brief in this case on behalf of the Senate Watergate
Committee.
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"The Constitution makes no mention of special presidential
immunities. Indeed, the Executive Branch generally is afforded
none. This silence cannot be ascribed to oversight."62
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Later, this same Court said:

6
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Lacking textual support, counsel for the President nonetheless
would have us infer immunity from the President's political
mandate, or from his vulnerability to impeachment, or from his
broad discretionary powers. These are invitations to refashion the
Constitution and we reject them."63
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Professor John Hart Ely - a distinguished Constitutional scholar, a former
chaired Pl'ofessor of Constitutional Law as Harvard Law School, a former chaired
Professor and the Dean of Stanford Law School, a special consultant to Watergate
Prosecutor Archibald Cox, and now a chaired Professor at the University of Miami
School of Law - concluded, after analyzing the debates at the Constitutional
Convention, that it would be "misleading" to argue that there was a special
Presidential immunity from criminal indictment or prosecution until the President
was first impeached. He concluded that "there was no immunity contemplated by the
framers-. or if they contemplated it they didn't say so ...." As Professor Ely went
on to explain:

62

Nixon u. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane):
"Thus, to find the President immune from judicial process, we
must read out of [United States u.] Burr, [25 Fed. Cases p. 30 (Case No.
14,6962d) (1807)] and Youngstown [Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952)], the underlying principles that the eminent
jurists in each case thought they were establishing. The Constitution

makes no mention of special presidential immunities. Indeed, the
Executive Branch generally is afforded none. This silence cannot be
ascribed to oversight. James Madison raised the question of Executive
privilege during the Constitutional Convention, and Senators and
Representatives enjoy an express, if limited, immunity from arrest, and
an express privilege from inquiry concerning 'Speech and Debate' on the
floors of Congress."
[footnotes omitted; emphasis added.]
63

487 F.2d at 711 [emphasis added).
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"To the extent that they [the Constitutional debates] suggest
anything on the subject, the debates suggest that the immunities
the Constitution explicitly granted members of Congress (which
do not, incidentally, include this sort of immunity [from criminal
prosecution]) were not intended for anyone else. The argument
for presidential immunity from indictment is one that must be
based on necessity - and perhaps, but only perhaps, the
presidency and vice presidency are distinguished on that score but not on·anything the framers said either in the Constitution
itself or during the debates."64
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Consider also some remarks that Joseph Story made in his COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION:

15

"There are other incidental powers, belonging to the
executive department, which are necessarily implied from the
nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these
must necessarily be included the power to perform them, without
any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The president
cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to
possess an official inviolability. In the exercise of his political
powers he is to use his own discretion .. .. But he has no
authority to control other officers of the government, in relation
to the duties imposed on them by law, in cases not touching his
political powers."65
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Some people focus on the phrase: ''The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest.,
imprisonment, or detention ...." However, they forget to read the rest of the
sentence, which gives him this immunity only when pursuing his official duties.:
"while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office ...." Obstruction of justice,
witness tampering, destruction of documents, accepting pay-offs - none of this is
part of the President's official duties. In fact, as Justice Story states, the President:
"has no authority to control other officers of the government, in relation to the duties
64

JOHiN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND

141 (Princeton University Press

1996) (emphasis added).
615

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TI-IE CONSTITIITION, § 814, at p. 579 (RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987, originally published,
1833); J OSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,§ 1563, at 418-19 (1833 ed.).
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imposed on them by law, in cases not touching his political powers."
Justice Story explained that these "other officers of the government" - judges,
federal prosecutors, the Independent Counsel - are supposed to do their jobs, to
perform the duties imposed on them by law. The duties imposed on the Independent.
Counsel are duties imposed by the IndepenQ.ent Com1.sel statute and by the decision
of Attorney General Janet Reno to petition the court to appoint an Independent
Counsel. The statute provides that Independent Counsel must, in general, comply
with the regulations of the Department of Justice.66 If President Clinton's alleged
criminal acts would be criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice if a
Cabinet Officer or Senator or Representative committed those crimes, and if the
alleged crimes are serious enough and the evidence of criminality is substantial so
that a federal prosecutor believes that he or she would secure a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt by a fair-minded jury, then the Independent Counsel; following his
statutory duty, should allow the Grand Jury to indict.
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The prosecution in this case does to refate to any political dispute between
Congress and the President. It does not relate to claims that the President should,
or should not have, exercised political discretion in a particular way. There is no
issue as to whether the President should have deployed a new Air Force bomber, or
whether the President should not have sent troops to Bosnia. The issues in this case
do not relate to the President's official duties. In fact, some of the issues occurred
before he became President, and all of the issues (obstruction, conspiracy, witness
tampering, etc.) have nothing to do with the President's official duties to take care
that the law be faithfully executed.67
·
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The language that I have quoted from Justice Story is often quoted in the
relevant case law. The courts have placed the same interpretation on that language
that I have. In Nixon u. Fitzgerald,68 for example, the Court quoted this language
from Justice St.ory69 and held that the President had no immunity from civil damages
for matters that were out.side the outer perimeter of his official duties. In fact, in that

66

CITE

67

The facts here are not like the situation in Morrison v. Olson, where a criminal
prosecution of a high-level political appointee of the President ar ouse out of "a bitter power
disput.e between the President and the Legislative· Branch . ..." 487 U.S. 654, 703, 1087 S.Ct.
2597, 2625, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
68

457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).

69

457 U.S. at 749, 102 S.Ct. at 2701.
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case, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Black.mun said explicitly that "there
is no contention that the President is immune from criminal prosecution in the courts
under the criminal laws ... (n]or would such a claim be credible.... Similarly, our
cases indicate that immunity from civil damage actions carries no protection from
criminal prosecution."70 By the way, Vice President Gore, while a U.S.
Representative, agreed with the dissent in this case ~d argued that the President
should not even be immune from civil damage suits for acts does in his official
capacity.71
The majority opinion in Fitzgerald did not dispute this conclusion that the
President is subject to criminal indictment. On the contrary, the majority appeared
to agree with the dissent on this point. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist,
Stevens, O'Connor & Chief Justice Burger, responded that absolute immunity from
civil damages '"does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish
that which occurs."'72 This is so because the judge or prosecutor - who, like the
President is absolutely immune from a civil damage lawsuit brought by a private
litigant in certain cases - can still be criminally prosecuted.73
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Clinton v. Jones74 also quotes this same passage from Justice Story. Justice
Stevens, for the Court, italicizes part of this quotation. The President -

27

The Court went on to say: "Story said only that 'an official inviolability,'

"cannot, therefore be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to
possess an official inviolability." (emphasis in original).76

70

457 U.S. at 780, 102 S.Ct. at 2717 (dissenting opinion).

71

See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, Paula Jones Day in Court, 17 LEGAL
24, 27 (May 30, 1994), reprinted, e.g., 10 TEXAS LAWYER 24, 27
(June 13, 1994), referring to Amicus Brief that Representative Gore joined.

TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.)

72

457 U.S. at 757 n.38, 102 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 38, quoting Imbler u. Pachtman, 424
U.S. a t 428-29, 96 S.Ct. at 994.
73

457 U.S. at 757 n.38, 102 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 38, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. at 428-29, 96 S.Ct. at 994.

'"

- U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).

7

-

r.

U.S. at - n . 23; 117 S .Ct. at 1645 n. 23 (emphasis in original).
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[emphasis by the, Court] was necessary to preserve the President's ability to perform
the functions of his office; he did not specify the dimensions of the necessary
immunity."76 Once again the Court made clear that there is no need to give the
President absolute immunity from crimin,al prosecution when he is charged with
offenses that do not relate to the discharge of the duties of his office because criminal
activities are not in the discharge of the President's offi,dal duties.

7
8

As the Court explicitly stated: "With respect to acts taken in his 'public

9
IO

character' - that is official acts - the President may be disciplined principally by
i.mpeachm'.ent, not by private lawsuits for damages. But he is otherwise subject to the
laws for his purely private acts."77 For private acts, acts taken in his private capacity,
the ·P resident is "otherwise subject to the laws." That has to mean "all" of the laws,
including the criminal laws. If a President suborns perjury, tampers with witnesses,
destroys documents, he is not acting in his official capacity as President. The fact
that some of these acts occurred prior to the time he became President does not
bolster his claim of immunity from the criminal laws.
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If the President is indicted for acts that occurred prior to the time he became

19

President and for acts that were not taken as part of his official constitutfonal duties,
then, as Clinwn v. Jone.s states: "the fact that a federal court's exercise of its tradition
Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief
Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution."78 The Court
added:
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"it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine
the legality of his [the President's] unofficial conduct."79
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If a President were indicted for acts not taken in his official capacity as
President, a federal court would only be exercising its traditional Article III
jurisdiction. Article III courts have the power to determine the legality of the
President's unofficial conduct, even though the exercise of that traditional jurisdiction
may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive.
If public policy and the Constitution allow a private litigant to sue a sitting

76

Id.

77

- U.S. a t -, 117 S .Ct. 1645 (emphasis added).

78

- U.S . at -, 117 S .Ct. at 1648-49.

79

-

U.S. at - , 117 S.Ct. at 1650.
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President for alleged acts that are not part of the President's official duties (and are
outside the outer perimeter of those duties) - and that is what Clinton u. Jones
squarely held- then one would think that an indictment is constitutional because
the public interest in criminal cases is greater than the public interest in civil cases.80

8

Although the Constitution, by its own terms, does not create a privilege, that
does not end the discussion, because the Supreme Court may create a common law
privilege or derive such a privilege from its earlier precedent. Let us now consider
this issue.

9

IO
11
12

13
14

15
16

IMPLIED PRIVILEGE?

First, one should look at the role that Executive
Privilege has played in the case law. The President, over the course of two centuries,
has sometimes raised a claim of Executive Privilege when Congress demands certain
information. But that was not the fact pattern involved in United States v. Nixon.n
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.

80

Nixon v. Fit,zgerald, the Supreme Court held that the President was absolutely
immune for civil damages involving actions taken within his official duties, but also
emphasized that this was "merely a private suit for damages" and that there is "a lesser public
int.crest in actions for civil damages than, for exampl,e, in criminal prosecutions." 457 U.S. 731,
754 & n.37, 102 S..Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37.
81

418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41L.Ed.2d1039 (1974). '

For a discussion of prior incidences where Presidents provided personal testimony,
under oath, pursuant to subpoena, see, Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as
Witnesses: A Bri.ef Historical Footrwte, 1975 U. OF ILLINOIS LAW FORUM 1 (1975).
The earlier cases - where the President complied with a subpoena in a criminal case
dlid not reach the U.S. Supreme Court. See also, 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§ 7·1(a)·(d) (West Pub. Co.•
2d ed. 1992)(and corresponding pages in 1998 pocket part).
However, the Supreme Court, prior to United States v. Nixon, did explicitly approve of
United States v. Burr, 25 Federal Cases 30, 34 (No. 14,6962d)(C.C.Va. 1807), the decision that
required President Jefferson to comply with a subpoena issued by an Article III court. After
stating that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" the Court, in Branzberg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972), added this footnote:
"Tn United States v. Burr Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, opined that
in proper circumstances a subpoena could be issued to the President of the
United States."
(continued ...)
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Instead, the question was quite different: whether the President could refuse to
disclose information relevant to a federal criminal prosecution brought in an Article
III court. President Nixon was the first President in history to litigate the use of
Executive Privilege in the court system and the U.S. Supreme Court and to refuse to
tum over evidence based on this theory. President Clinton is only the second
President in history to raise and.litigate Executive Privilege in an effort to block
evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.82
The main case on this question, United States v. Nixon, recognized a very
limited form of an evidentiary privilege in the case where the President pleads
Executive.Privilege to a subpoena issued under the authority of an Article III court.
in connection with a criminal case.83
While the Supreme Court recognized Executive Privilege in United States v.
Ni,ron it did not apply it to shield the President; it did not allow President Nixon to .
assert it in order to prevent disclosure of Presidential tapes regarding confidential
conversations. As Judge Robert Bork recently explained: "Nixon's claim, being based
only on a generalized interest in confidentiality was overcome by the need of the
81

(...continued)
Branzberg u. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 688 n.26, 92 S.Ct. at 2660 n.26.
~
Thus far, President Clinton has lost on this issue. He raised, and then
abandoned, the Executive Privilege claim in his wisuccessful effort to prevent the Independent
Counsel from subpoenaing not.es taken by Government lawyers (various Whit.e House counsel)
of conversations with Hillary Clinton. See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, Lips Unlocked:
Attorney Cl~nt Privi/.ege and Government Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 2122, 28 (June 30, 1997).
8

President Clinton also unsuccessfully raised Executive Privilege in an effort to prevent
Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal from testifying before the Grand Jury. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Misc: Action 98-095, 98-096 & 98-097 (NHJ), filed under seal, May 4, 1998
(D.D.C.Cir.) (Judge Norma Holloway Johnson).
83

418 U.S. at 712, n.19, 94 S.Ct. at 3109 n.19:
"We are not here concerned with the balance between the
President's generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for
relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the
confidentiality interest and the congressional demands for information,
nor with the President's interest in preserving state secrets. We address
only the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized
privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant
evidence in criminal trials."
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courts and parties in a criminal case for relevant evidence."84 The Court, in short.
recognized Executive Privilege and then ordered the President to turn over the
evidence. The Court rejected any claim of a general Executive Privilege in criminal
proceedings. 'If the matter involved military secrets - where the missile silos are
buried in Montana - or diplomatic secrets - the contents of a secret cable from the
Ambassador to China - the courts are likely to recognize a privilege in the
appropriate case. But the issues that surrounded President Nixon, and the issues
now surrounding President Clinton, do not fall in these categories.
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In addition, the Supreme Court, in its reasoning in United States v. Nixon,
relied on the "necessary and proper'' clause of Article I.85 That clause gives Congress
the power to expand on other powers - to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers."86 This power is
granted to Congress, not to the President. United States v. Nixon suggests that
Congress may well have the power, under the necessary and proper clause, to create,
explicitly, some sort of immunity from criminal prosecution for the President - ·
assuming that this immunity (whether temporary or absolute) is not so broad that it
violates other provisions of the Constitution.87 But Congress has not done so. It has
enacted no statute giving any sort of immunity from the criminal laws to the
President.

21

84

Robert H. Bork, Indict Clinwn?- How I
JOURNAL, March 18, 1998, at A22, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).

Wish It Were Possibk, WALL STREET

86

418 U.S. at 706 n.16, 94 S.Ct. at 3106 n.16, citing McCuUoch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
86

U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 18.

87

Congress could, if it wished, provide for what is known as "protective
jurisdiction" so that criminal actions that stat.es bring against federal officials must be tried
in federal court rather than state court.
However. it is an open question whether it would be constitutional for Congress to enact
a statute that, either explicitly or in effect, immunizes the President from the application of
federal criminal laws. All of the acts of Congress must comply with the limitations of the Bill
of Rights. For example, could Congress provide that the President is immune from criminal
law if he kills someone, or takes that person's property by theft or deception, or imprisons that
person? The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
"deprived of life , liberty, or property, without due process of law." If the President (like an
absolute Monarch) has immunity from the criminal law, will we really be a nation of laws and
not of men? Did our predecessors revolt from one king only to install another?
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RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTE REJECTS CRIMINAL IMMUNITY. No federal
statutes recognize, or purport to recognize, any Presidential immunity from criminal
indictment. Indeed, Congress has done quite the opposite: it has created an
Independent Counsel stature for the express purpose of investigating alleged criminal
activities of the President. In fact, it enacted this statute with a specific background
of criminal allegations surrounding thi,s particular President. And this particular
President not only signed the law, he and his Attorney General lobbied for the law
so that the Special Division of the District of Columbia Circuit could appoint an
Independent Counsel to investigate alleged criminal activities of this President.88
Attorney General Janet Reno testified that "President Clinton and the Department
of Justice strongly supported reauthorization" of the Independent Counsel Act.89

The legisfative history of the Independent Counsel law nowhere states that the
President cannot be indicted, or is above the law or is immune from the criminal law
as long as he is a sitting President. The official Legislative History of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, creating the first independent law, does not suggest that the
President is immune from indictment. In fact, it takes pains to reject any such
suggestion. The relevant legislative history provides the following:
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"Subsection (c) simply gives the special prosecutor, who has
information which he wants to turn over to the House of
Representatives because it involves potentially impeachable offenses
against the individuals names in this subsection, the authority to so
tum over that information.

26

"Thi,s sectwn should in no way be interpreted as identifying
individuals who are not subject to criminal prosecution prwr to being
impeached and removed from office. In fact, a number of persons
holding the positions identified in this subsection have been subject to

27
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criminal prosecution while still holding such an offi.ce."90
THE BORK MEMORANDUM. The distinguished constitutional scholar and then

88

See generally, Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103270. 4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 809-1 (1994).
89

4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, at 753
(1994)(emphas is added).
90

Legislative History of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat.
at Large 1824, U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE NEWS 41216, 4287-88 (emphasis
added) ..
·

NW: 1601 8 Docld: 70102162 Page 31

32
1
2
3
4
5

Solicitor General, Robert Bork, concluded in a Memorandum he filed in the criminal
prosecution of Vice President Agnew, that the Vice President could be indicted and
tried prior to impeachment but the President, in contrast, would be immune from
criminal prosecution prior to impeachment. Judge Bork relied on several arguments.
One of the most significant was that-
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"The Framers could not have contemplated prosecution of an
incumbent President because they vested him complete power
over the execution of the laws, which includes, of course, the
power to control prosecutions."91
·

If President Clinton had the complete "power to control prosecutions" today,
Judge Bork's analysis would be applicable. But President Clinton made sure that he
does not have the "complete power" to "control prosecution." President Clinton and
Attorney General Reno lobbied for the Independent Counsel Act, and President
Clinton signed it.92 This law places important limitations on the Attorney General's
power to remove the Independent Counsel. The Independent Counsel can, in brief,
only he removed for cause. President Clinton signed the law and decided to give up
his "complete power" to "control prosecution." Under the statute, the Independent
Counsel can only be removed "for cause." The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of limiting the removal power in Morrison v. Olson.93
Judge Bork's reasoning implies that the President is subject to indictment if

91

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury I mpane/,ed December 5, 1972, Applicatwn

of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 20.
92

The fact that the President has signed this law is relevant in determining
whether this law - and its implicit authorization of a grand jury to investigate alleged
criminal acts by President Clinton "disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches" and "prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing itts constitutionally assigned
functions." Nixon v. Admini,strawro{General Services, 433 U.S. 425, - , 97 S.Ct. 2777, -. 53
L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), quoting United States u. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d
1039 (1974). In deciding that the law was constitutional. Nixon u. Admini,strator emphasized:
"The Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the
Act into law ...." In that case,·the Act was applied against a former President. In this case,
the Executive Branch became a party to the Independent Counsel Act when the present
President - President Clinton - signed a law that was written to create an Independent
Counsel to investigate that same President - President Clinton.
113

487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
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he gives up the power to control prosecutions. And that is exactly what President
Clinton did.
Judge Bo:rk, in his Memorandum concluding that the Vice President - but not
the President - can be indicted prior to impeachment, also relied on the TWENTYFIFTH AMENDMENT in support of his conclusion.94 Judge Bork argued that "the
President is the only officer from whose temporary disability the Constitution
provides procedures to qualify a replacement.." From that he concludes: "This is
recognition that the President is the only officer whose temporary disability while in
·office incapacitates an entire branch of government."
_However, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment suggests the opposite conclusion,
especially after the decision in Jones u. Clinton. Because· of this Amendment, the
temporary disability of the President does not incapacitate an entire branch of
government because the Constitution itself rec.ognizes the pr9blems and deals with
it in a structural way, not by creating an immunity but by providing for a temporary
replacement. In addition, the indictment of the President does- not incapacitate either
the President or entire Executive Branch. Aaron Burr was quite able to function as
a Vice President although indicted. Indictment does not incapacitate the indicted
individual.
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In the unlikely event that the defense of a civil case (e.g., Jones v. Clinton) or
the defense of a criminal case would prevent the President from performing his
duties, the Executive Branch does not simply shut down. The Twenty Fifth
Amendment, § 3, provides a procedure for the Executive Branch to continue to
function "[w]henever the President transmits . .. his written declaration that is
unable t.o discharge the powel'S and duties of his office ...." This procedure is clearly
not limited to cases of illness.
One should also note that it is easy to make a claim that the Executive Branch
will simply "shut down," .but that claim is difficult to accept. President Clinton,
during the pendency of the Jones case, said repeatedly that the looming civil case was
not affecting his duties as President. Nonetheless, while he was making those
statements, the defense attorneys claimed that a delay was necessary because of the
burdens on the President. The trial judge in Jones v. Clinton refused to change the
date of the civil trial. When attorneys cry "wolf' too often, they lose their credibility.
(Subsequently, the trial judge granted summary judgment to the defendant.)
94

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Ca se Number Civil 73-965,
Memorandum for t he United States Concerning t he Vice Preside n t's Claim of Constitutional
Immu nity, Oct. 5, 1973, a t p. 18.
·

NW: 1601 8 Docld: 70102162 Page 33

34
- 1

2
3

4
5
6

7
8

9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23

TEMPORARY IMMUNITY CREATED BY STATUTE. Perhaps Congress could enact
a stature creating some sort of temporary immunity, - that is, providing that there
shall be no trial of a sitting President until after he has finished his term of office as
President. However, enactment of such a law would raise important constitutional
and policy issues.

First, in terms of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused
a right to a "speedy and public trial." If Congress were to enact a statute that
immunizes a sitting President from any criminal indictment as long as he holds
office, then the delay in the indictment (and resulting delay in any trial) will run
afoul of the speedy trial guarantee. Presumably the President could waive this right,
in ~y particular case. However, if the President could waive this right, then he
should be able to waive his other rights. If one of his rights is the right to temporary.
immunity, then he should be able to waive that right as well.
And, if the President has a right to temporary immunity, he appears that he
may have waived this right by signing the Independent Counsel Act - which was
enacted only after this President and his Attorney General advocated its passage.
Janet Reno stated that President Clint.on ''strongly supported reauthorization" of this
Independent Counsel Act.95 President Clinton lobbied for, and signed,98 the present
Independent Counsel Act, with full knowledge that the Act's first court-appointed
counsel would be specifically charged with investigating criminal allegations against
President Clinton.

24

25.
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27

As President Clint.on stated when he signed the law:

"[This law] ensures that no matter what party controls · the
Congress or the executive branch, an independent, nonpartisan
process will be in place to guarantee the integrity of public
officials and ensure that no one is above the law."91

28
29
30
95

4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, at 753

(1994)(emphasis added).
96

In Ni.xon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53
L.Ed .2d 867 (1977) the Court found it significant - in deciding the case involving the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against former President Nixon that the "Executive Branch became a party t;o the Act's regulation when President Ford signed
the Act into law .. .." 433 U.S. at 426, 97 S.Ct. at 2781. In t his case, President Clinton
himself, not a s ubsequent President, signed the Act into law .
97

Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S.24, June 30, 1994,
(continued ...)
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President Clinton was correct. As Lloyd Cutler, the former Counsel to President
Clinton, said in supporting the concept of an Independent Counsel, President Nixon
was "certainly not a fluke. The qualities that betrayed him and us are far from
unique, and we will see them in future administrations again."98
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Second, in terms of policy, if Congress were to enact temporal immunity from
criminal liability for the President, it would first have to consider the costs. The old
proverb, "justice delayed is justice denied;" applies with special vigor in the context
of a criminal prosecution. The statute of limitations may prevent prosecution. As
veteran prosecutors know, if a trial is delayed, then the memories of witnesses will
fade, documents may be destroyed. It is an axiom that delaying a criminal trialespecially delaying for years - may result in, or be tantamount to creating, a de facto
immunity.

In any event, even if Congress could enact a statute immunizing the President
from the federal criminal laws, it has not done so. Instead, it has enacted a statute
that authorized an Independent Counsel to use the federal grand jury system to
investigate alleged criminal activities of this President.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
THE CASE LAW AND LEGAL OPINIONS. N0 legal precedent has ever concluded

that the President is immune from the federal criminal laws. In fact, the cases have
suggested the contrary.
For example, in 1972, Gravel v. Uni'ted States99 noted: ''The so-called executive
privilege has never been applied to shield executive officials from prosecution for
. ...."
en.me
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In 1982, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 100 the Supreme Court held that the President
was absolu'tely immune for civil damages involving actions taken within his official
duties, but also emphasized that this was "merely a private suit for damages" and

91

( ••• continued)

in, 30 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1383, July 4, 1994.
98

Lloyd Cutler, A Permanent "Special Prosecuwr," WASHINGTON Posr, Dec. 2,

1974, at A24, col. 4.
99

408 U.S. 606, 627, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).

100

457 U.S. 731. 102 S.Ct. 2690. 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).
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that there is "a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example,
in criminal prosecutions." 101 This Court also made clear that there would be no
immunity from civil damage claims, for actions that were not "within the outer
perimeter of his [the President's] authority." 102 There is only "absolute Presidential
immunity from damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official.
responsibility."103
In 1994, Lloyd Cutler, the White House Counsel to President Clinton, issued
his official legal opinion that it was against the Clinton Administration policy to
invoke Executive Privilege for cases involving "personal wrongdoing'' by any
government official. 104
Later, in Clinton v. Jones,1° 5 the Court rejected any notion of Presidential
immunity (even a temporary immunity) for the President who is sued by a private
civil litigant for damages involving acts not within his Presidential duties. In that
case, President Clinton's "strongest argument" supporting his claim for immunity on
a temporary basis, the Court said, was the claim that the President occupies a
"unique office" and burdening him with litigation would violate the constitutional
separation of powers and unduly interfere with the President's performance of his
official duties.106
In language of remarkable breadth, the Jones Court repeatedly stated that rw
amount of this kind of burden would violate the Constitution. The President, the
Court held: "errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the
Executive, even quite burdensome interactio,ns, necessarily rise to the level of
constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability to perform its
constitutionally mandated functions." 107 The opinion, which had no dissents, quoted
with approval James Madison's view that separation of powers "does not mean that
101

457 U.S. 731, 754 & n.37, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37 (emphasils added).

102

457 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. at 2705.

103

457 U.S. at 756. 102 S.Ct. at 2704.

10
"

Lloyd Cutler Legal Opinion of Sept. 28, 1994, discussed in, T.R.Goldman, Cutl,er

Opined Against Broad Use of Privilege,

LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON,

105

- U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).

106

- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1645-46.

107

- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648.
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the branches 'ought to have no partwl agency in, or no controul over the acts of each
other."' 108
And, if that were not clear enough, Justice· Stevens' opinion added this
clincher:
'The fact that a federal court~ exercise of its traditional Article III
jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of
the Chref Executive is not sufficrent to establish a violation of the
Constitution. •Jlo9
The Court explained that it ''has the authority to determine whether he has acted
within the law." 110 And, "it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial
process in appropriate circumstances." 111

14
15
16

17
18
19

In the Watergate Tapes case (United States v. Nixon 112], President Nixon
argued that a President could Ii.ot be subject to the criminal process because, "if the
President were indictable while in office, any prosecutor and grand jury would have
within their power the ability to cripple an entire branch of the national government
and hence the whole system." 113 The Court did not reach that question, but Clinton
108

U.S. at - , 117 S.Ct. at 1648 (emphasis in original), quoting THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-36 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), which also has emphasis in the
original.
109

-

U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (emphasis added). I ten.tatively explored the
implications of the strong language of the Jones case is, Ronald D. Rotunda, The True
Significance of Clinton vs. Jones, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 8, 1997, at 12, col. 1-6; Rotunda.
Can a President Be Imprisoned?, 20 LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 22-23 (July 21.
1997). However, my earlier writing mainly quoted from that case. Now I have investigated
this issue fully. Based on my evaluation of the Constitutional history, the Constitutional
language, legal precedent, the relevant statutes and case law, and the view of commentators,
and I am reaching the conclusion of this legal opinion.
110

-

- U.S. at - . 117 S.Ct. at 1649.

m
- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1649-50, citing and relying on, Rotunda, Presidents
and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1975);
1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANC~ &
PROCEDURE§ 7.1 (West. Pub. Co., 2d ed. 1992) & 1997 Pocket Part.
112

418 U.S. 683. 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41L.Ed.2d1039 (1974).

113

Brief for the Respondent, Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, in
(continued...)
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v. Jones later rejected the argument that the uniqueness of the Presidential Office
requires that the Court recognize some sort of immunity from the law. Clinton v.
Jones held that, even if the burden of litigation is heavy, the Constitution gives the
President no special redress from that burden.
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If even aprivat,e party instituting civil litigation may impose special litigation
burdens on a sitting President, then the President's argument for a relief from the
burdens of litigation is much less when the Federal Government initiate·s a criminal
case, where the public interest of justice is much greater114 because the party is the
United States, 116 and the action is criminal, not civil.

11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25
26

27
28

ARGUMENTS OF PRESIDENT NIXON AND OTHERS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS
IMMUNE FROM THE CRIMINAL LAW. President Nixon's argument - that "any

prosecutor and :g rand jury would have within their power the ability to cripple an
entire branch of the national government" - is inapplicable here. Neither "any''
prosecutor nor "any'' grand jury cannot institute criminal charges against a sitting
President. The Independent Counsel Act does not authorize anyone to institute
charges; it only gives its authority to the Independent Counsel, who can only be
appointed if the Attorney General (who serves at the discretion of the President) asks
the Special Division for an appointment.
Nor can it be ·a rgued that an indictment would close down the entire Executive
Branch of the Federal Government. The President can continue his duties, and 'h
federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly
burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a
violation of the Constitution. •-UG If the President is indicted, the government will not
shut down, any more than it shut down when the Court ruled that the President must
answer a civil suit brought by Paula Jones.

29

113

( .••continued)
United States u. Nixon, Nos. 73-1766 & 73-1834 (October term, 1973), at p. 97.

114

Recall, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S .Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349
(1982), the Court specifically noted that, when there is "merely a private suit for damages,"
then there is "a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal
prosecutions." 457 U.S. 731, 754 & n.37, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37.
116

The Independent Counsel institutes its criminal litigation in the name of the
United States. E.g., United States u. Webster Hubbell, et al., Crim. No. 98-0151 (JRJ).
116

-

U.S. at-. 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (emphasis added).
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President Clinton may well argue that a criminal indictment of the President
would inevitably place the nation in turmoil and bring the entire government to a
halt. Oddly enough, those same people argue that the solution is to impeach the
President. Would not an impeachment place the nation in even more turmoil?
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Moreover, this argument was rejected in Nixon v. Sirica, 117 which stated, over
a quarter of a century ago, that the President "does not embody the nation's
sovereignty. He is not above the law's commands . ..."118 A criminal proceeding
would take no more time than a civil case against the President (and we know that
is Constitutional). Moreover, any sanction if there is a conviction can be postponed
until after the President is no longer a sitting President.
In short, to the extent that case law discusses this issue, the cases do not
conclude that the President should have any immunity, either absolute or temporary,
from the law. On the contrary, they point to the conclusion that, since the birth of the
Republic, our constitutional system rejected the fiction that the King can do no
wrong. In fact, in the Clinton v. Jones case, President Clinton himself specifically did
not place any reliance on the claim.that the President enjoyed the prerogatives of a
monarch. 119 He has not stated that he would now embrace such a claim, and, if he
did, there is no reason to believe that a court would accept that claim any more than
the courts.accepted President Nixon's claims of immunity.

1

IMPEACHMENT, INDICTMENT, AND THE COMMENTATORS

117

487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane).

118

487 F.2d at 711:
"Though the President is elected by nationwide ballot, and is often said
to represent all the people, he does not embody the nation's sovereignty.
He is not above the law's commands: With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving
free government except that the Executive be under the law . . ..'
Sovereignty remains at all times with t he people, and they do not forfeit
through elections the right to have the law construed against and
apphed to every citizen." (footnotes omitted).

In light of this case, it should be clear that the President is subject to a grand jury subpoena
to give evidence. The President can, of course. plead the Fifth Amendment and refuse to
testify, as could any other witness.
119

- U.S. at - n.24, 117 S.Ct. at 1646 n.24.-
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A few commentators have questioned whether the impeachment process must
be completed before an indictment can issue. No case has ever ruled that any officer
subject to the criminal law must be impeached before he or she is prosecuted
criminally. In fact, whenever the issue has been litigated, the cases have held that
impeachment need not precede crimiilal indictment. 1zo As early as 1796, when the
Constitution and the nation were less than a decade old, Attorney General Lee
advised Congress that a territorial court judge could be indicted for criminal offenses
while in office although he had not been impeached. Lee, by the way, gave no
suggestion that the President should be treated differently. 121
There certainly is no suggestion in the language of the Constitution that the
President is otherwise to be treated any differently than other civil officers. If the
Framers wanted to treat the President differently - for example, if they wanted to
make sure that the President is immune from indictment until after he has been
impeached - then they could have written such language. They certainly knew how
to write such language. Our Constitution refers to "impeachment" several times, and
creates no special rules for the President except it provides a different procedural rule
in one specific instance: when the President is tried in the Senate, the Constitution
provides that the Chief Justice of the United States (rather than the Vice President)

120

As the Seventh Circuit noted in upholding the criminal conviction of Federal
Judge Otto Kerner:
"The Constitution does not forbid the trial of a federal judge for criminal
offenses committed either before or after the assumption of judicial office.
The provision of Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, that an impeached judge is 'subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according t.o Law' does not
mean that a judge may not be indicted and tried without impeachment
first. The purpose of the phrase may be to assure that after impeachment
a trial on criminal charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double
jeopardy, or it may be to differentiate the provisions of the Constitution
from the English practice of impeachment."

United States v. Jssaes, 493 F .2d 1124, 1142 (7'h Cir. 1974). Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda,
/mpeiaching Federal J udges: Where Are We and Where Are We Going?, 72 J UDICATURE: THE
J OURNAL OF THE AMERICAN J UDICATURE SOCIETY 359 (1989); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on
the Constitutwnal Parameters of Federal Impeachment. 16 KENTUCKY LAW R EVIEW 707 (1988).
12 1

3 H INDS, PRECEDENTS OF TH E H OUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES 982-83 (W ashingt.on,

1907).
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presides over an impeachment trial. 122 The Framers made the decision to treat the
President differently on one issue only: they explicitly provided that the Chief Justice
shall preside only in the case of a Presidential impeachment. 123 The Framers did not
want the Vice President from presiding over the impeachment of the President
because he would be in a conflict of interest: if the President were to be impeached,
the Vice President would become President. 124
It is generally recognized, as Justice Joseph Story noted, that an impeachable
offense is not limited to a criminal or statutory offense.125 Moreover, not all crimes
are impeachable. To determine what are ''high crimes and misdemeanors" Justice
Story advised that one must look to the common law, but it is not necessary to look
to the list of statutory crimes. He added:
"Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion,
that no previous [violation of] statute is necessary to authorize an
impeachment for any official misconduct; and the rules of
proceeding, and the rules of evidence, as well as the principles of
decision, have been uniformly regulated by the known doctrines
of the common law and parliamentary usage. In the few cases of

15
16
17
18
19
122

U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House has "sole Power of Impeachment"); ART. I,
§ 3, c. 6 (Senate has "sole Power t.o try all lmpeachmen~" and, in an impeachment trial of the
President, the Chief Justice shall preside); ART. I, § 3, cl. 7 (impeachment sanctions cannot
impose criminal penalties, but criminal sanctions may be imposed by separate criminal trials);
ART. II, § 4 ("all civil Officers of the United States" are subject t.o impeachment).
123

One can look at quotations by various of the Framers of the Constitution, but,
in "dealing with these historical materials a seriou~ danger exists of reading into statements
made two hundred years ago a meaning not intended by the speaker." WATERGATE SPECIAL
PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg t.o Philip
Lacovara, at 4. See also various memoranda attached to this Memorandum and marked as
"confidential."
This WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum - after examining the
historical record - concludes that the hist.orical sources of two centuries ago "are equivocal
lending little firm support for or against the proposition that the Framers intended t.o
. immunize a sitting President from criminal liability." Id. at 9.
124

See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters
of Federal Impeachment, 76 KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW 707 (1988).
123

See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, §§ 403·07, at pp. 28790 (RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds.. Carolina Academic Press, 19.87, originally
published, 1833).
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impeachment, which have hitherto been tried, no one of the
charges has rested upon any statutable misdemeanour. It seems,
then, to be the settled ·doctrine of the high court of impeachment,
that though the common law cannot be a foundation of a
jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or laws, that
jurisdiction, when given, attaches, and is to be exercised
according to the rules of the comm.on law; and that, woot are, and
w"lwt are not high crimes and misdemeanours, is to be ascertained
by a recurrence ro toot great basis of American jurisprudence." 126
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Story's judgement has stood the test of time. Impeachment charges have not
been limited to violations of federal crimjnal statutes. Federal judges have been
indicted before they are impeached. 127 Indeed, to emphasize the distinction and
separation of impeachment and criminal indictment, one judge was impeached after
he had been acquitted in a criminal trial. 128

16
126

JOSE:PHSTORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,§§ 405, at p. 288 (RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987, originally published,
1833)(emph~sis added).
127

This has long been the rule. In 1796, Attorney General Lee informed Congress
that a judge of a territ6rial court, a civil officer of the United States subject to impeachment,
was indictable for criminal offenses while in office. 3 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 982-83 (Washington, 1907). The "Framers did not intend civil officers
generally to be immune from criminal proces~." In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury
Impaneled Dec. 9, 1972, Memorandum for the Unites States Concerning the Vice President's
Claim of Constitutional Immunity, at p. 99, quoting 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra.
For example, Judge Otto Kerner was indicted and convicted before there was any
impeachment. His resignation ended the need for a subsequent impeachment. See United
States u. Isaccs, 493 F.2d 1124, U.42 (7th Cir. 1974), citing the 1796 Attorney General Opinion
upholding the conviction of Judge Kerner even though he had not been impeached and
removed by Congress. Kerner then resigned from the bench and was not impeached.
Judge Walter Nixon (who did not resign from the bench) was impeached after he was
. convicted. See, Nixon u. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).
128

J udge Alcee Hastings falls in this category. See, Hastings v. Judicial Conference
of the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally, WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS (1992). The House impeached Judge Hastings by a lopsided vote of 413 to
3; the Senat;e removed him in 1989. Hastings was subsequently elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives. Joe Davidson, Ex-Judge Is Likely To Join the Congress That Impeached
Him, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1992, at Al, 1992 WESTLAW-WSJ 629646.
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INDICTABILITY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. Similarly, hi.story demonstrates that
the Vice President can be indicted and criminally prosecuted before being impeached
(and whether or not he has been impeached). New Jersey, for example, indicted Vice
President Aaron Burr for the death of Alexander Hamilton in a duel. 129 Burr did not
act as if he were immunized from indictment. Instead, he fled the jurisdiction to
avoid arrest. 130 Burr continued functioning as Vice President while under indictment;
in fact, Burr (as President of the Senate) even presided over the impeachment trial
of Justice Chase. 131 Vice President Spiro Agnew also argued, unsuccessfully, that he
was immune from indictment prior to impeachment, but he ended up being indicted
on corruption charges, pleading guilty, and resigning from offi.ce. 132
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President Clinton, like President Nixon, may wish to argue that the Presidency
is "unique," and that the President alone represents "the Executive Branch."
Consequently, it is argued, the President alone is immune from the criminal laws
while he is sitting as President.
The Court, in Nixon v. Sirica, 133 explicitly rejected that argument. "Because
impeachment is available against all 'civil Officers of the United States,' not merely
against the President, U.S. Const. art. II,§ 4, it is difficult to understand how any
immunities peculiar to the President can emanate by implication from the fact of
i.mpeachability."134 A criminal indictment and even a trial do not "compete with the
impeachment device by working a constructive removal of the President from
o:ffi.oe."135 If the·President is acquitted, there is no "constructive removal" from office. ·
129

1 MILTON LOMASK, AARON BURR 329, 349.55 (1979).

180

Id.

181

See, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSEClITION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973,
from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 29-30.
132

E.g., RICHARD D. COHEN ,& JULESWITCOVER,AHEARTBEATAWAY (1974).

133

487 F.2d at 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane).

134

487 F.2d at 711 n .50.

135

487 F .2d a t 711:

"Nor does the Impeachment Clause imply immunity from routine court
process. While the President argues that the Clause means ·that
impeachability precludes criminal prosecution of an incumbent, we see
no need to explore t his question except to note its irrelevance to the case
(continued...)
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If the President is convicted, the punishment may not include imprisonment, and if it does - any imprisonment can be stayed until he no longer is a sitting President.
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The test that Nixon v. Sirica adopted is directly applicable here. A criminal
indictment and even a trial do not "compete with the impeachment device by working
a constructive removal of the President from office." However, imprisonment may be
a "constructive removal of the President from office," and, if it is, that sanction cannot
be imposed on a sitting President. But indictment and trial are not the same as
imprisonment. If there is a trial, the President may be acquitted. Ifhe is convicted,
the sanction may not include imprisonment, and if it does, that sanction can be
stayed until after the Presidential term has ended.
CONGRF.SSIONAL POWER TO CONTROL THE DECISION TO INDICT. If an official
subject to impeachment (such as the President, Vice President, or a federal judge)
could not be indicted until after he or she had been impeached, then Congress would
control the decision whether to prosecute. But such a power would be inconsistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, which does not give Congress a role in the
execution of the laws. 136
The decision to prosecute or not prosecute is a decision that cannot lie with the
legislature. In the instant case, it lies with the Independent Counsel, who, under the
statute, stands1in the shoes of the Attorney General. The decision to appoint the
Independent Counsel rests in the unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that neither the courts nor Congress can
require the appointment of an Independent Counsel. 137

26
27
28
29

The decision to indict a sitting President lies with the Grand Jury, not with the
House of Representatives or Senate. As Nixon v. Sirica eloquently stated: ''The
federal grand jury is a constitutional fixture in its own right, legally independent of

13~

(...continued)
before us. The order ent.ered below, and approved here in modified form,
is not a form of criminal process. Nor does it compete with the
impeachment device by working a constructive removal of the President

from office."
487 F.2d 700 at 711(emphasis added).
136

See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714. 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986).

137

Morrison v. O~on, 487 U.S. 654, 694-95, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2621, 101 L.Ed.2d 569
(1988). This point is discussed in detail in note 10, supra.
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the Executive.... If a grand jury were a legal appendage of the Executive, it could
hardly serve its historic functions as a shield for the innoc,e nt and a sword against
corruptwn in high places." 138 The Court went on to state that, as "a practical, as
opposed to legal matter, the Executive may, of course cripple a grand jury
investigation,'' but even though the President may have the practical power to
handicap the grand jury in various ways, "it is he who must exercise them. the court
will not assume that burden by eviscerating the grand jury's independent legal
authority."139
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THEWATERGATEExPERIENCE. The Watergate Special Prosecution Force did
not indict President Nixon but named him an unindicted coconspirator. President
Nixon resigned from office, was pardoned by his successor, President Ford, and the
issue was never tested in court. Some modem day commentators assume that the
Watergate Special Prosecutor concluded that a sitting President is immune from
indictment. That assumption is simply wrong.

16

17
18

19
20
21
22

The Watergate Special Prosecutor only argued that, in the narrow
circumstances of that case - where the House of Representatives had already made
the independent judgment to begin impeachment proceedings, when the House of
Representatives, prior to any turnover of Grand Jury evid,ence, had independently
decided to.consider the very matters that were before the·Grand Jury - the President
should not be indicted until after the impeachment process had concluded. 140

138

487 F .2d at 712 n.54 (emphasis added)(internal citations omitted).

189

487 F.2d at 713 n.54 (emphasis in original).

uo
See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 100 (1976). Jaworski argued
that his Watergate Special Prosecution Force could seek an indictment against the President
for some crimes (like murder), but, Jaworski said, he questioned whether it was appropriate
to indict the President for other crimes, like obstruction of justice, "especially when the House
Judiciary Committee was then engaged in an inquiry into whether the President should be
impeached on that very ground."

Of course, Jaworski's comments must be read in context. First, no case law reaches the ·
conclusion that Jaworski and other lawyers working for him reached at the time. His
· ambivalent opinions are not legal precedent.
More importantly, Jaworski's decision was quite nuanced. The distinctions he drew
argue that an indictment would be appropriate in tl~e present case because no impeachment
is under way. In addition, Jaworski conclusion that the President should not be indicted was
tentative ("grave doubts," not firm conclusions), and those conclusions, he emphasized, were
(continued...)
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140

(. •• continued)
made in the specific factual and historical context within which the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force operated. That factual and historical context is different today.

That factual and historical context is important. It is significant that the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force was a very different animal than the present Office of Independent
Counsel. Unlike the present Office of Independent C.Ounsel, the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force was not a creature of statute. It was merely a creation of executive regulation. Until
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue, it was unclear if the courts could even rule on an
evidentiary dispute between the Special Prosecutor and a "superior officer of the Executive
Branch." United States v. Nixon, 94 U.S. 683, 692-93, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3100, 41L.Ed.2d1039
(1974). The decision of the Wat.ergat.e Special Prosecutor not to seek to indict President Nixon
was made in the context where even the powers of the Special Prosecutor to subpoena evidence
from the President were unclear. I have examined the series of memoranda dealing with the
issue of the amenability of President Nixon to indictment. The various memoranda are not of
one opinion (some favored indictment), and they specifically raised concerned about the
permissibility of an indictment brought by a Special Prosecutor who was appointed by, and
could be fired by, the Attorney General, when the Special Prosecutor was protected only by a
regulation signed by the Attorney General, and the validity of this entire arrangement had not
been tested in court. See, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26,
1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 33-34.
Significantly, the regulations that created the Watergate Special Prosecutor provided
that the "Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties ... without the President's first
consulting the ·Majority and .Minority Leaders and the Chairmen and ranking Minority
Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives and
ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with his proposed action." 38 FED. REG. 30739,
quoted in, Unit,ed States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 n.8, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3101 n.8. The Nixon
Court did not specifically rule on this provision. We know now that a law that gives Congress
(or certain members of C.Ongress) a role in limiting the removal of executive branch officials is
unconstitutional. As Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3186, 92 L.Ed.2d
583 (1986) held:
"The Cons:titution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the
supervision of officers charged with execution of the laws its enacts.... Once the
appointment has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly
provides for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon
impeachment .... A direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged
with the execution of the laws beyond this limited one [of impeachment] is
inconsistent with separation of powers."
One could see why the Watergate Prosecutor was hesitant to claim a power to indict,
when the very existence of the Watergate Prosecutor was constitutionally in doubt (a doubt
·
(continued...)
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( ••• continued)
that bore fruit in Synar). No such doubt applies to the present Office of Independent Counsel,
for Congress has no role t;o play in the removal of the Independent Counsel, and the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108
S.Ct. 2597, 101L.Ed.2d569 (1988).

At the time that Jaworski wrote his tentative conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court had.
not even decided that a President could be sued for damages in a civil case. The Court later
answered yes t;o that question in, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d
349 (1982).
Moreover, the Memoranda on this issue show that the att.orneys in the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force divided on this issue. E.g., WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 43, 44:

"The i.ssue i.s close. Respectable arguments derived from history and
cont.emporary policy exist on both sides of the issue .... [M]y conclusion is that
the Constitution does not preclude indictment, and the issue is really whether
the incumbent President should be indicted." [emphasis added.]
See al.so, JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 133 et seq. (Princeton University Press
1996), reprinting his memorandum to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox that argued that the
President could be indicted.

_ Commentators prior to Morrison v. Olson. The view of legal commentators
regarding the indictment of a sitting President was mixed, prior to Morrison v. Olson. Those
commentat.ors claiming that the President is immune from criminal prosecution have typically
discussed the issue in a vacuum, not in the context of a specific investigation of a President
pursuant to a statU!te, enacted at the President's request, authorizing a criminal investigation
of the President. See George E. Danielson, Presidential Immunity from Criminal Prosecution,
. 63 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1065 (1975) (arguing that the President is immune from criminal
prosecution); PHILIP KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1978) (arguing that
the President is immune from criminal prosecution). Note that these commentators wrote
without benefit of the Supreme Court decision in, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct.
2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
Other commentat.ors have argued that the President and all other officials are subject
· to indictment prior to impeachment- in part because some acts may not be impeachable but
are certainly indictable. See, RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 215 (2d ed. 1829):
"the ordinary tribunals, as we shall see, are not precluded, either before or after
impeachment, from taking cognizance of the public and official delinquency."
(continued ...)
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However, prior to that situation
in the case where the House of
Representatives had not already begun impeachmentprocess - historians forget that
the Watergate Special Prosecution Force was advised that the President could be

140

( .•.continued)
(emphasis added).

Quoted in, wATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from
Richard Weinberg t.o Philip Lacovara. at 13. See also other authorities cited therein. Accord,
JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 133 et seq. (Princeoon University Press 1996),
reprinting his 1973 memorandum t.o Special Prosecut.or Archibald Cox arguing that President
could be indicted.

Commentators after Morrison v. Olson. Post-Morrison v. O/,son commentators have
tended t.o conclude that the President is not above the law. See, Gary L. McDowell, Yes, You
CM Indict the President, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 9, 1998, at A19, col. 3-6 (Midwest ed.);
Edwin B. Firmage & R.C. Man.g rum, Removal of the President: Resignatwn and the Procedural
Law of Impeachment, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1023 (arguing that President is not immune from the
criminal process); Eric Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President
Immune from Criminal Prosecutwn Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 7 (1992)
(thorough article concluding that the President is not immune); Terry Eastland, The Power to
Control Prosecutwn, 2 Nexus 43, 49 (Spring, 1997)(referring to Morrison v. Olson and
concluding that the President is not immunized from prosecution); Eric M. Freedman,
Achieving Political Adulthood, 2 NEXUS 67, 84 (Spring, 1997), concluding:
"To the extent that the belief that the President should have a blanket
immunity from criminal prosecutions manifests itself in legal form, legal
decisionmakers should reject it. The argument is inconsistent with the history,
structure, and underlying philosophy ofour government, at odds with precedent,
and unjustified by practical considerations."

See also, Scott W. Howe, The Prospect of a President Incarcerated, 2 NEXUS 86 (Spring, 1997),
arguing that the President has no constitutional immunity from criminal prosecution, but
Congress may wish to create some limited immunity by statute.
Jay S. Bybee, Who Executes the Executioner?, 2 NEXUS 53 (Spring, 1997) argues that
before the President, or federal judges, can be tried, they first must be impeached, an
argument that is more in the nature of a polemic, because it uproots two centuries of practice
regarding the prosecution of federal judges. See also Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The.
PresU:lential Privilege Against Prosecutwn, 2 NEXUS 11 (Spring, 1997), which prnsents such a
broad argument for Presidential immunity that it is inconsistent with Clinton v. Jones, - U.S.
- . 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).
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USE OF GRAND JURY TO COLLECT EVIDENCE FOR AN IMPEACHMENT.

5

INTRODUCTION. If it is unconstitutional for a federal grand jury, acting
pursuant to the Independent Counsel statute to indict a President for engaging, in
his private capacity, in serious violations of federal law, then it would be a gross
abuse of the grand jury powers and a violation of federal statutory and constitutional
law for that grand jury to investigate whether the President has committed any
criminal law violations. But we know, after Morrison v. Olson, 142 that it is
constitutional for the Independent Counsel to use the grand jury to investigate the
President. That conclusion was implicit in the holding of Morrison. Hence it should
be constitutional to indict a sitting President because it would not be constitutional
to use the grand jury to investigate if it could not constitutionally indict.
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Let us analyze this argument in more detail.
commentators acknowledge:

First, as all the legal

"The grand jury is authorized only to conduct criminal investigations.
Accordingly, it is universally acknowledged that the grand jury cannot
be used to conduct an investigation - or even explore a particular line
of inquiry - solely in order to collect evidence for civil purposes." 143
Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the federal government may not "start
or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal prosecution seem[s] likely." 144 If
the grand jury investigation "is merely a pretext for a civil evidence-gathering

w
JOHN HART ELY, ONCONSI'ITimONALGROUND 133 et·seq. (Princeton University ·
Press 1996), reprinting his: Memorandum to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox on the Legality
of Calling President Nixon before a Grand Jury (1973). · Professor Ely explains that
"prosecution of a sitting (non-impeached) president must be possible, or else there would be no
way to reach" crimes that do not rise t.o the level of impeachment. Id. at 139. Ely expanded on
t hose arguments in id. at 140-41.
142

487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).

143

2 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.0 l
at 2 (Callaghan & Co., 1986)(emphasis added).
144

United States v. Sells Engineering Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3142,
77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983). See also, 2 SA~A SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW
AND PRACTICE§ 10.14 at 51 (Callaghan & Co., 1986)

NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 49

50
1
2

mission, the grand jury process is clearly being abused under any standard." 146

3

There are few cases where the courts have found that the Government has
abused the grand jury system in order to gain evidence that would or could not be
used in a criminal prosecution. But, where the courts find a bad motive, they do not
allow an illegal use of the grand jury system.
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In the present case, it is quite clear that one of the purposes of the grand jury
investigation conducted by the Office of Ind.e pendent Counsel is to investigate
President Clinton. Of course, the OIC and the grand jury·have other persons whom
it is investigating and whom it may indict (or already have indicted). And, to that
extent, the actions of the several Grand Juries in this investigation are proper.
Morever, to the extent that it is conducting a valid criminal investigation, it may
disclose the fruits of its investigation for civil purposes to the extent that statutes or
rules governing such disclosure so authorize.1 48
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However, in this case it is clear that some of the grand jury's subpoenas, some
of the energy of the OIC, and a portion of the mandate of the OIC are intended solely
to investigate criminal allegations against the President in connection with issues
such as Whitewater, Castle Grande, the FBI White House files, the alleged illegal
abuses involving the Travel Office of the White House, and - most recently allegations involving possible Presidential perjury, subordination of perjury,
tampering of witnesses, and obstruction of justice in the litigation captioned as Jones

v. Clinton.
The purpose of the OIC investigation and the grand jury investigation is to
determine whether the President has, or has not, engaged in serious crimes. If the
grand jury .cannot indict the President for such crimes, then it has no business
investigating the President's role in such crimes. Impeachment, after all, is an

146

2 SARA SUN BEALE &WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 8.03
. at 9 (Callaghan & Co., 1986).

See also Unit.ed St,at,es v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (D. N.J. 1960).
This case was on remand from, Unit.ed States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct.
983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and it applied the test adopted in that case.
146

E.g., United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476. 103 S .Ct. 3164, 77 L.Ed.2d 785
(1983); R ULE 6(E), FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMl~AL PROCEDURE.
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admittedly nnncrirninal proceeding. 147 If the purpose of the grand jury investigation
of President Clinton is not to indict even if the evidence commands indictment (or if
its :purpose is simply to investigate possible impeachable offenses on behalf of the
House of Representatives and then turn over this information to the House), then, in
either case, the grand jury is being misused. 148
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WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO TURN OVER INFORMATION TO ANOTHER
UNIT OF GoVERNMENT. It would be wrong, for example, to use the grand jury solely
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to gather information to be used by another governmental unit. If the grand jury is
investigating in good faith to determine if the President has engaged in any criminal
conduct, it may turn over, to the House of Representatives, information that it has
gathered in its investigation of alleged criminality that also is relevant to the House
even if the grand jury ultimately concludes that it is not relevant to a criminal
inquiry,

The important point is that the grand jury must act in good faith and not as
the agent of another entity of the government. "It is sufficient if the agencies are
engaged in good faith investigations within their respective jurisdictions, and that
one agency is .not simply serving as a cat's paw for another, under the pretext of
conducting its own investigati.on." 149 Grand Juries cannot be used as a short cut for
the House. of Representatives to collect information that otherwise would be more
difficult to secure. 150 The OIC cannot use the grand jucy to investigate alleged
criminal activity by the President if an indictment (assuming that the evidence
warranted it) is "merely an unexpected bare possibility." 151 The OIC (which sits in
the shoes of the Attorney General) must have an open mind whether to seek an
indictment, but it cannot have an open mind about this issue if it would be illegal or

1
"

E.g., the sanction cannot result in imprisonment or fine. The standard of proof
is not beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no jury of twelve people drawn from the general
public. An impeachment and removal do not prevent a criminal prosecution.
148

On the other hand, it would be proper to turn over information secured in good
faith for purposes of securing an indictment but that is also relevant to impeachment.
149

2 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02
at 6 (Callaghan & Co., 1986), citing, United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55,
58 (D. N.J . 1960).
1110

United States u. Proctor & Gamb/.e Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683-84, 78 S.Ct. 983, 987,

2 L.Ed.2d (1957).
161

United States v. Proctor & Gamb/.e Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 58 (0. N.J. 1960).
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unconstitutional to indict the President. 152
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In other words, if the statute creating the OIC and authorizing it to investigate
the President and turn over relevant information to the House of Representatives
does not authorize or permit the OIC to seek an indictment of the President, the
statute is authorizing an abuse of the grand jury powers, an unconstitutional
perversion of the Fifth Amendment, which created the grand jury. It is clearly
improper to use the grand jury, a creature of the criminal process, to collect evidence
for noncriminal purposes. It is unconstitutional to use the grand jury solely as a tool
of a House impeachment inquiry to investigate in an area where it could not indict
even if the evidence warranted an indictment.
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WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO INVESTIGATE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
WHO CANNOT BE INDICTED FOR A CRIME BECAUSE HE ALREADY HAs BEEN
INDICTED. It is. improper for the Government to use the grand jury to investigate a

target's role in a matter after the grand jury has indicted the target. If the grand jury
has already indicted a target, it is an abuse of the grand jury system to use the grand
jury to investigate further on that matter. Because the grand jury cannot indict the
target on the matter in question - the target, after all, has already been indicted it cannot use its investigatory powers to further investigate the target. 163
That logic applies here too. If the grand jury cannot indict the target (because
be :i s President) then it cannot use its investigatory powers to further investigate the
target.

1112

Grand Jury Presentments. In some instances, .a Grand Jury can issue a
report, a "presentment'' without issuing any indictments. But such a Grand Jury is
investigating alleged criminal activities and could i.ndict. Even in these circumstances, civil
libertarians have raised serious objections to such presentments.
No Grand Jury should be the alter ego of the House Judiciary Committee or any other
House entity investigating possible ilnpeachment. The House of Representatives has the "sole"
power to impeach [U.S. CONITT., ART. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House has "sole Power oflmpeachment")] and
should not treat the Office of Independent Counsel as its alter ego or tool.
153

E.g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 845, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 50 (1964); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duce& Tecum Dated
January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985)(To protect the grand jury from

being "abused," where defendant makes a "strong showing that the government's dominant
purpose [in issuing a subpoena) was pretrial preparation," for an already pending indictment
the court will quash the subpoena. In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and quashed the subpoena.) See also In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D.
Ohio 1922).
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WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO INVESTIGATE A MATTER WHERE IT

2

WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL To INDICT. As discussed above, the Speech or
Debate Clause gives an absolute constitutional privilege that will protect a Member

., 3
4

5
6

7
8
9
l0
11

12

of Congress from being questioned about his or her vote on a legislative matter.
Assume that a grand jury was investigating a matter where it could not
constitutionally indict, given the narrow, but absolute protections of the Speech or
Debate Clause. It would be unconstitutional for the grand jury to inquire into
matters where it could not constitutionally indict. 154 If the grand jury cannot
constitutionally :indict for particular actions because of the Speech or Debate Clause,
then it cannot constitutionally ask questions regarding this matter. 165 Courts should
"not hesitate to limit the grand jury's investigative power in deference to this
congressional privilege." 1116
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If the grand jury cannot indict the President (because it would be
unconstitutional to do so), then the Independent Counsel certainly cannot use the
grand jury to investigate President Clinton. If the President is somehow immune
from indictment and above the law, then the grand jury (whether in Arkansas or in
Washington, D"C. or elsewhere) would be acting unconstitutionally, as would the
federaI trial judges who supervise these Grand Juries. If it is unconstitutional to
indict the President, it is unconstitutional for the grand jury to investigate him.
Bu~. we know that it is constitutional for the Independent Counsel to
investigat.e the President to det.ermine if he should be indict.ed for criminal acts. That
was what Morri.son v. Olson157 was all about.

Morrison upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act. · That
case decided, irµplicitly, that it must be constitutional to indict the President if the
evidence warrants and demands such an indictment. That conclusion was implied
in the holding of Morrison v. Olson, and it explains why the Court later issued its
strong language in Clinton v. Jones , rejecting the notion that the federal judiciary's
exercise of jurisdiction over the President creates a problem of separation of powers.

111
'

Grauel u. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628-29, 33
L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).
1116

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18. 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2629 n.18, 33

L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).
uis

P AUl. S. DIAMOND , FEDERAL G RAND JURY P RACTICE AND PROCED URE §

6-3 1 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1995). S ee also id. at§ 4.0l[D].
1117

487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L. Ed.2d 569 (1988).
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''The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article Ill
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jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of
the Chi.ef Executive is not suffici.ent to establish a violation of the
Constitution. '"58
As discussed above, distinguished Constitutional scholar, former Federal
Judge, and former Yale Law Professor Robert Bork concluded, in a famous
Memorandum he filed when he was Solicitor General of the United States, that
Federal prosecutors could investigate and indict a sitting Vice President. It is
noteworthy to recall the first sentence of that Memorandum:

"The motion by the Vice President [Spiro T. Agnew] poses
a grave and unresolved constitutional issue: whether the Vice
President of the United States is subject to federal grand jury .
investigation and possible indictment and trial while still in
offi.ce."169
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Solicitor General Bork properly concluded that, if the Vice President could not be
indicted, the grand jury could not subject him to an investigation. Because, he
concluded, the grand jury could constitutionally indict the Vice President, therefore
it could constitutionally investigate the Vice President.
CONCLUSION

We must keep in mind the following:

27
28

29
30

31
32
33

...

34

1118

the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson upholding
the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act and the authority
it besrows on a gran~ jury t;o investigate criminal charges involving the
President of the United States;
the decision of President Clinton to lobby for and sign this legislation
with full knowledge that a prime focus of that Act would be allegations
surrounding his own conduct;
the decision of Congress not · to enact any legislation conferring

- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (e mphasis added).

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury lmpane/,ed December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
m

Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice Preside n t's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 1.
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Clinton;
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immunity from -crimjnal prosecution but, on the contrary, to enact
legisl~tion to create the Office of Independent Cm,msel to investigate
allegations of criminal conduct involving President Clinton;
the legislative history of the law creating an Independent Counsel
indicating specifically that Congress did not intend to bestow any
criminal immunity to any person covered by that Act;
President Clinton's full knowledge that the Act's fust court-appointed
counsel would. be specifically charged with investigating President
. the decision of President ·Clinton's Attorney General to petition the
Special Division to appoint such an Independent Counsel;
the subsequent decision of President Clinton's Attorney General on
several occasions to petition the Special Division to expand the
jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel to include other allegations of
criminal conduct involving President Clinton.
the counts of an indictment against President Clinton would include
serious allegations involving witness tampering, document destruction,
perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and
illegal pay-offs counts that in no way relate to the President
Clinton's official duties, even though some of the alleged violations
occurred after he became President.

These factors all buttress and lead to the same conclusion: it is proper,
constitutional, and legal for a federal grand jury to indict a sitting President for
serious criminal acts that are not part of, and are contrary to, the President's official
duties. In this country, no one, even President Clinton, is above the law.
This conclusion does not imply that a President must be required to serve an
actual prison term before he leaves office. The defendant President could remain free
pending bis trial, 160 and the trial court could defer any prison sentence until he leaves
office.161 The defendant-President may petition the courts to exercise its discretion
in appropriate cases. It is one thing for the President to petition the court to exercise
its discretion; it is quite another for the President to announce that he is above the
law and immune from criminal prosecution.

35

160

The re is, after a ll, no ris k of flight to avoid prosecut ion.

161

POST,

See Ronald D. Rotunda, When Duty Calls, Courts Can Be Flexible, WASHINGTON
Janua ry 29, 1997, a t p. A21, col. 2-3.
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Before or after indictment, Congress could exercise its independent judgment
as to whether to begin impeachment proceedings or await the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings. 162 Or, if Congress did not wish to postpone the impeachment
proceedings, Congress if it wished (and if the President agreed), could ask the
Independent Counsel to delay the criminal trial. The President could also petition
the court to stay or postpone the criminal trial until the impeachment proceedings
were concluded.
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Neither the criminal proceeding nor the impeachment proceeding will control
the other. As Solicitor General Bork pointed out a quarter of a century ago:
"Because the two processes have different objects, the
considerations relevant to one may not be relevant to the other."
For that reason, neither conviction nor acquittal in one trial, though it may he
persuasive, need automatically determine the result in the other trial." 163
And, the House or Senate may conclude that "a particular offense, thoug:h
properly punishable in the courts. did not warrant" either impeachme·n t or removal
from office. 164

Sincerely,

24
25
26

27
28

Ronald D. Rotunda

29

ALBERT E. JENNER, JR. PROFESSOR OF LAW

m
Of course. if Congress decides to institute impeachment proceedings. it will
decide whether a penalty is to be imposed, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate (e.g., removal
from office, or a lesser penalty, such as a public censure).
163

In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 9 (Robert Bork, Solicitor General).
In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965,
164
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Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitution.al
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